沃什說過什么？

凱文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）的提名，一度引發(fā)市場劇烈波動。Warsh說過什么？以下是他本人言論匯總，由“流動性筆記”整理，供讀者參考。

全文約12000余字

沃什，放言變革美聯(lián)儲的人

美國時間周五早盤，白銀現(xiàn)貨暴跌

一、2006年：入職確認聽證會

"I hope that my prior experience on Wall Street, particularly my nearly 7 years at Morgan Stanley, would prove beneficial to the deliberations and communications of the Federal Reserve." （我希望我此前在華爾街的經(jīng)歷，特別是在摩根士丹利近7年的工作，能對美聯(lián)儲的審議和溝通有所裨益。）

二、2007年：危機前夕

2007年3月「Market Liquidity」演講

"The benefits of greater liquidity are substantial, through higher asset prices and more efficient transfer of funds from savers to borrowers. Historical episodes indicate, however, that markets can become far less liquid due to increases in investor risk aversion and uncertainty." （流動性充裕的好處是實質(zhì)性的……但歷史經(jīng)驗表明，市場可能因投資者風險厭惡和不確定性上升而變得流動性嚴重不足。）

"While policymakers and market participants know with certainty that these episodes will occur, they must be humble in their ability to predict the timing, scope, and duration of these periods of financial distress." （雖然政策制定者和市場參與者確知這些事件會發(fā)生，但他們必須對預(yù)測這些金融困境時期的時機、范圍和持續(xù)時間保持謙卑。）

2007年9月 Albany大學演講

關(guān)于成長背景：

"I learned much of what I need to know about the real economy in my first eighteen years here." （我在這里（紐約州上州）的前十八年學到了理解真實經(jīng)濟所需的大部分知識。）

2007年11月「The End of History?」演講

"If the end of economic history were at hand, what would it look like? You would almost assuredly find strong, synchronized global economic growth; favorable inflation readings and anchored inflation expectations; low global risk premiums and low term premiums; muted volatility across asset markets..." （如果經(jīng)濟的歷史終結(jié)即將到來，它會是什么樣子？你幾乎肯定會發(fā)現(xiàn)強勁、同步的全球經(jīng)濟增長；良好的通脹數(shù)據(jù)和錨定的通脹預(yù)期；低全球風險溢價和低期限溢價；各資產(chǎn)市場波動率低迷……）

"In my view, recent financial turmoil should not be considered an accident of history. Rather, it is History's latest reminder to policymakers and market participants alike that we ought to be humble in our convictions and cautious in our deeds." （在我看來，近期的金融動蕩不應(yīng)被視為歷史的意外。相反，它是歷史對政策制定者和市場參與者的最新提醒——我們應(yīng)該對自己的信念保持謙卑，對自己的行為保持謹慎。）

"Market confidence ultimately begot complacency." （市場信心最終滋生了自滿。）

三、2008年：金融危機

2008年3月18日 FOMC會議（貝爾斯登獲救前）

"I think, most fundamentally, that the business model of investment banks has been threatened, and I suspect the existing business model will not endure through this period." （我認為最根本的是，投資銀行的商業(yè)模式已受到威脅，我懷疑現(xiàn)有的商業(yè)模式無法度過這一時期。）

2008年3月 FOMC會議

關(guān)于通脹：

"On the inflation front, there is little reason to be confident that inflation will decline." （在通脹方面，幾乎沒有理由相信通脹會下降。）

2008年5月21日「The Federal Funds Rate in Extraordinary Times」演講

"This may be the most pronounced time of testing for central banks in a generation." （這可能是一代人以來對央行最嚴峻的考驗時刻。）

"The Fed is not omniscient. Neither are our tools uniquely and perfectly suited to ensure that the ills of yesterday do not recur. Nor can we guarantee that our policy response alone will set the economy on a steady and obvious path to unequalled prosperity. We run serious risks if we overstate our knowledge or overplay our hand." （美聯(lián)儲不是無所不知的。我們的工具也不是獨一無二、完美無缺地能確保昨日的弊病不再重演。我們也無法保證僅憑我們的政策回應(yīng)就能讓經(jīng)濟走上通往無與倫比繁榮的穩(wěn)定明確道路。如果我們夸大自己的知識或過度出手，就會面臨嚴重風險。）

"Look no further than the financial wizards in the financial sector recently who were convinced that risks were manageable and returns exponential. Milton Friedman reminded us long ago, and Edmund Phelps more recently, of the 'consequences of conceit.'" （看看金融業(yè)最近那些自以為風險可控、回報呈指數(shù)級增長的金融奇才就夠了。米爾頓·弗里德曼很久以前就提醒過我們，埃德蒙·費爾普斯最近也提醒過我們"自負的后果"。）

"Even if the economy were to weaken somewhat further, we should be inclined to resist expected, reflexive calls to trot out the hammer again. Policy actions should reinforce the notion with stakeholders that further hammering needs to be done, but it needs to be accomplished by the financial institutions themselves." （即使經(jīng)濟進一步走弱，我們也應(yīng)傾向于抵制那些預(yù)期中的、條件反射式的再次祭出大錘的呼聲。政策行動應(yīng)向利益相關(guān)者強化這樣一個觀念：進一步的錘打工作需要做，但它需要由金融機構(gòu)自己來完成。）

"In my view, only when private financial agents resume their role as the primary source of liquidity in markets will proper credit market functioning and support for economic growth be restored." （在我看來，只有當私人金融主體恢復(fù)其作為市場流動性主要來源的角色時，信貸市場的正常運作和對經(jīng)濟增長的支持才能恢復(fù)。）

2008年9月 FOMC會議（雷曼倒閉后）

"I'm still not ready to relinquish my concerns on the inflation front." （我仍然不準備放棄對通脹的擔憂。）

Bernanke對此的反應(yīng)（第二天給Don Kohn的郵件中發(fā)泄）：

"I find myself conciliating holders of the unreasonable opinion that we should be tightening even as the economy and financial system are in a precarious position and inflation/commodity pressures appear to be easing." （我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己在安撫那些持不合理觀點的人——他們認為即使經(jīng)濟和金融體系處于危險境地、通脹/大宗商品壓力似乎正在緩解，我們也應(yīng)該收緊政策。）

2008年11月「The Promise and Peril of the New Financial Architecture」演講

"During the past several months, this domestic housing-centric diagnosis has also been subjected to a natural experiment. Among U.S. financial institutions, asset quality concerns are no longer confined to the mortgage sector." （在過去幾個月里，這種以國內(nèi)住房為中心的診斷也經(jīng)受了一場自然實驗。在美國金融機構(gòu)中，資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量擔憂已不再局限于抵押貸款部門。）

四、2009年：危機后

2009年4月6日「The Panic of 2008」演講

"The encouraging news, I should note, is that panics end." （我應(yīng)該指出，令人鼓舞的消息是，恐慌會結(jié)束。）

"It is difficult for the strong to thrive, let alone survive, when they reside in a neighborhood that is being decimated. And when panic conditions persist and long-held articles of faith lose their following, markets often react indiscriminately." （當強者居住在一個正被摧毀的街區(qū)時，他們很難繁榮，更不用說生存了。當恐慌狀況持續(xù)存在，長期以來的信條失去追隨者時，市場往往會不加區(qū)分地做出反應(yīng)。）

2009年6月「Defining Deviancy」演講

關(guān)于"正常"的定義：

標題本身就很有意味——"定義偏差"，暗示危機改變了人們對"正常"的認知。

2009年9月25日「Longer Days, Fewer Weekends」演講

"If policymakers insist on waiting until the level of real activity has plainly and substantially returned to normal — and the economy has returned to self-sustaining trend growth — they will almost certainly have waited too long." （如果決策者堅持等到實際經(jīng)濟活動水平明顯且實質(zhì)性回歸正?！麄儙缀蹩隙〞鹊锰谩＃?/p>

"There is a risk, of much debated magnitude, that the unusually high level of reserves, along with substantial liquid assets of the banking system, could fuel an unanticipated, excessive surge in lending." （有一個規(guī)模尚有爭議的風險，即異常高的儲備金水平，加上銀行體系的大量流動資產(chǎn)，可能會引發(fā)意想不到的、過度的貸款激增。）

"The second anniversary of the onset of the financial crisis—and about a year from the darkest days of the Panic of 2008—is no time to declare victory, scarcely the moment to hand out medals." （金融危機爆發(fā)兩周年——距離2008年恐慌最黑暗的日子約一年——現(xiàn)在不是宣布勝利的時候，也幾乎不是頒發(fā)獎?wù)碌臅r刻。）

"The final recounting of economic history, I submit, will judge that winning the battle against the Panic of 2008 was a necessary but insufficient condition to win the peace and ensure a strong foundation for economic prosperity." （我認為，經(jīng)濟史的最終記載將會判定，贏得與2008年恐慌的戰(zhàn)斗是贏得和平、確保經(jīng)濟繁榮堅實基礎(chǔ)的必要但非充分條件。）

"'Whatever it takes' is said by some to be the maxim that marked the battle of the last year. But, it cannot be an asymmetric mantra, trotted out only during times of deep economic and financial distress, and discarded when the cycle turns." （有人說"不惜一切代價"是標志著過去一年戰(zhàn)斗的格言。但它不能是一個不對稱的咒語——只在深度經(jīng)濟和金融困境時期祭出，而在周期轉(zhuǎn)向時就拋棄。）

五、2010年：QE2辯論

2010年2月3日「Regulation and Its Discontents」演講

"The Panic of 2008 that exacerbated the recession is the result of a multitude of flawed private and public practices, with regulatory error being only one part." （加劇衰退的2008年恐慌是眾多有缺陷的私人和公共實踐的結(jié)果，監(jiān)管錯誤只是其中一部分。）

"Reforms must encourage robust competition. Market entry and market exit can be a more effective means of developing a stronger, more resilient financial system. The too-big-to-fail problem could be mitigated if smaller, dynamic firms seized market share from less nimble incumbents." （改革必須鼓勵強有力的競爭。市場進入和市場退出可以成為發(fā)展更強大、更有韌性的金融體系的更有效手段。如果規(guī)模較小、充滿活力的公司從不那么靈活的在位者手中奪取市場份額，"大到不能倒"的問題可能會得到緩解。）

2010年3月26日「An Ode to Independence」演講

"There is no such thing as being a little bit independent or a little bit credible. So, central bankers must be constantly vigilant, especially during times of fiscal expansion." （不存在'有點獨立'或'有點可信'這回事。因此，央行家必須時刻保持警惕，尤其是在財政擴張時期。）

"Even if the central bank can does not mean the central bank should." （即使央行能做到，也不意味著央行應(yīng)該做。）

"The Panic of 2008 is now prologue. The Fed's actions going forward—especially when economic conditions still appear unsatisfactory—should go a long way to demonstrating its allegiance to mission." （2008年恐慌現(xiàn)在只是序幕。美聯(lián)儲今后的行動——特別是在經(jīng)濟狀況仍然不盡人意時——應(yīng)該大力證明其對使命的忠誠。）

"Central bankers are entrusted with a revocable privilege. So, declarations of independence by Fed policymakers are heartening. But independence is ours to demonstrate, not principally to declare." （央行家被賦予的是一種可撤銷的特權(quán)。因此，美聯(lián)儲政策制定者對獨立性的宣言令人鼓舞。但獨立性是我們要證明的，而不主要是要宣示的。）

2010年11月 FOMC會議（QE2表決）

失業(yè)率接近10%時對Bernanke說：

"If I were in your chair, I would not be leading the Committee in this direction, and frankly, if I were in the chair of most people around this room, I would dissent." （如果我坐在你的椅子上，我不會帶領(lǐng)委員會走這個方向；坦率說，如果我坐在這房間大多數(shù)人的位置上，我也會投反對票。）

"I think we are removing much of the burden from those that could actually help reach these objectives, particularly the growth and employment objectives, and we are putting that onus strangely on ourselves rather than letting it rest where it should lie." （我認為我們正在把本應(yīng)由其他人承擔的重擔攬到自己身上——特別是增長和就業(yè)目標——而不是讓它落在本該承擔的地方。）

"We are too accepting of dangerous policies from others that have been long in the making, and we should put the burden on them." （我們太容易接受其他人長期以來制定的危險政策了，我們應(yīng)該把負擔放到他們身上。）

2010年11月8日「Rejecting the Requiem」演講（SIFMA年會）

投票支持QE2后一周：

開場定調(diào)：

"They call it 'the new normal.' I call it the new malaise." （他們叫它"新常態(tài)"。我叫它新低迷。）

"I reject this view. I consider this emerging ethos to be dangerous and defeatist and debunked by America's own exceptional economic history." （我拒絕這種觀點。我認為這種新興的精神風貌是危險的、失敗主義的，并且被美國自身非凡的經(jīng)濟歷史所駁斥。）

"The dour economic tale being told is not inevitable. Our citizens are not unwitting victims of some unavoidable fate. The current period of subpar growth and high unemployment is real, but it need not persist. We should not lower our expectations. We should improve our policies." （正在被講述的悲觀經(jīng)濟故事并非不可避免。我們的公民不是某種不可避免命運的無辜受害者。當前低于標準的增長和高失業(yè)率是真實的，但它不必持續(xù)下去。我們不應(yīng)該降低期望。我們應(yīng)該改進政策。）

關(guān)于短期主義：

"Chronic short-termism in the conduct of economic policy has done much to bring us to this parlous point." （經(jīng)濟政策執(zhí)行中的慢性短期主義在很大程度上把我們帶到了這個危險的境地。）

關(guān)于財政刺激：

"These programs may well have boosted gross domestic product (GDP) for a quarter or two, but that is scarcely a full accounting of their effects. These stimulus programs did little, in my view, to put the economy on a stronger, more sustainable trajectory." （這些計劃可能確實在一兩個季度內(nèi)提振了GDP，但這幾乎不能完全解釋它們的效果。在我看來，這些刺激計劃幾乎沒有讓經(jīng)濟走上更強勁、更可持續(xù)的軌道。）

"Sound fiscal policy must do more than reacquaint consumers with old, bad habits." （健全的財政政策必須做的不僅僅是讓消費者重新養(yǎng)成舊的壞習慣。）

關(guān)于供給側(cè)：

"If untreated, the cyclical becomes structural. Persistent weakness in the labor markets, in effect, permanently disqualifies more workers from a place in the labor force." （如果不加治療，周期性就會變成結(jié)構(gòu)性。勞動力市場的持續(xù)疲軟實際上會永久性地使更多工人失去在勞動力市場中的位置。）

關(guān)于美聯(lián)儲角色：

"The Federal Reserve is not a repair shop for broken fiscal, trade, or regulatory policies." （美聯(lián)儲不是修復(fù)破碎的財政、貿(mào)易或監(jiān)管政策的修理店。）

"Given what ails us, additional monetary policy measures are, at best, poor substitutes for more powerful pro-growth policies." （鑒于我們的病因，額外的貨幣政策措施充其量只是更強有力增長政策的拙劣替代品。）

"The Fed can lose its hard-earned credibility—and monetary policy can lose its considerable sway—if its policies overpromise or underdeliver." （如果政策承諾過多或兌現(xiàn)不足，美聯(lián)儲可能失去來之不易的信譽——貨幣政策也可能失去其相當大的影響力。）

"We should be leery of drawing inapt lessons from the crisis to the current policy conjuncture. Lender-of-last-resort authority cannot readily be converted into fighter-of-first-resort power." （我們應(yīng)該警惕從危機中得出不恰當?shù)慕逃?xùn)……最后貸款人權(quán)力不能輕易轉(zhuǎn)化為首要作戰(zhàn)者的力量。）

關(guān)于QE2風險：

"Expanding the Fed's balance sheet is not a free option. There are significant risks that bear careful monitoring by the FOMC." （擴大美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表不是免費的選擇。存在重大風險，需要FOMC仔細監(jiān)控。）

"The Treasury market is special. It plays a unique role in the global financial system. It is a corollary to the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. The prices assigned to Treasury securities—the risk-free rate—are the foundation from which the price of virtually every asset in the world is calculated." （國債市場是特殊的。它在全球金融體系中扮演著獨特角色。它是美元作為世界儲備貨幣角色的推論。國債證券的價格——無風險利率——是計算世界上幾乎所有資產(chǎn)價格的基礎(chǔ)。）

"As the Fed's balance sheet expands, it becomes more of a price maker than a price taker in the Treasury market." （隨著美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表的擴張，它在國債市場上越來越像價格制定者，而非價格接受者。）

"The Fed's expanded participation in the long-term Treasury market also runs the more subtle risk of obfuscating price signals about total U.S. indebtedness." （美聯(lián)儲在長期國債市場擴大參與還存在一個更微妙的風險——模糊關(guān)于美國總債務(wù)的價格信號。）

"Extraordinary measures tend to beget extraordinary countermeasures. Second-order effects can have first-order consequences." （非常措施往往會招致非常對策。二階效應(yīng)可能產(chǎn)生一階后果。）

六、2011年：辭職

2011年2月10日致奧巴馬總統(tǒng)辭職信

未給出具體原因，任期原本到2018年1月31日。

Larry Kudlow評價（CNBC）：

"a hard money hawk"（強硬貨幣鷹派）

七、離開美聯(lián)儲后（2011-2025）

2014年「Warsh Review」（英國央行評審）

核心論點：

透明度不是越多越好。美聯(lián)儲公開FOMC記錄后，"自由流暢討論被事先準備的罐頭演講取代"。

2015年CNBC采訪

關(guān)于市場定價失真：

"Financial markets and the Treasury market are telling us almost nothing about the state of the economy because central banks are influencing those prices with every word, with every nuanced speech from every reserve bank president." （金融市場和國債市場幾乎沒有告訴我們?nèi)魏侮P(guān)于經(jīng)濟狀況的信息，因為央行正在用每一個詞、每一位地區(qū)聯(lián)儲主席的每一篇細微演講影響著那些價格。）

"We would be better off if markets were setting prices instead of taking their lead from a bunch of government officials seven years into a U.S. economic recovery." （如果讓市場來定價，而不是在美國經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇七年后仍由一群政府官員來引導(dǎo)，我們會好得多。）

"This strikes me as quite inconsistent with the original ideas of what QE would be." （這在我看來與QE最初設(shè)想的樣子相當不一致。）

"Interest rates need to be set in financial markets, and interest rates are not set in financial markets when the Federal Reserve and the world's other central banks are the buyers of first and last resort." （利率需要由金融市場來設(shè)定，而當美聯(lián)儲和世界其他央行成為第一和最后買家時，利率就不是由金融市場設(shè)定的。）

2015年10月26日《華爾街日報》專欄（與Michael Spence合著）

「The Fed Has Hurt Business Investment – QE is Partly to Blame for Record Share Buybacks and Meager Capital Spending」

"We believe that QE has redirected capital from the real domestic economy to financial assets at home and abroad." （我們認為QE已經(jīng)將資本從國內(nèi)實體經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)移到國內(nèi)外的金融資產(chǎn)。）

"In this environment, it is hard to criticize companies that choose 'shareholder friendly' share buybacks over investment in a new factory. But public policy shouldn't bias investments to paper assets over investments in the real economy." （在這種環(huán)境下，很難批評那些選擇"股東友好型"股票回購而非投資新工廠的公司。但公共政策不應(yīng)該偏向紙質(zhì)資產(chǎn)投資而非實體經(jīng)濟投資。）

"Central banks have been quite successful in stoking risk-taking by investors in financial markets. Clearly, market participants believe central bankers use QE, among other reasons, to put a floor under financial asset prices." （央行在刺激金融市場投資者承擔風險方面相當成功。顯然，市場參與者相信央行使用QE的原因之一是為金融資產(chǎn)價格設(shè)置底線。）

"QE reduces volatility in the financial markets, not the real economy. In fact, much like 2007, actual macroeconomic risk may be highest when market measures of volatility are lowest." （QE降低的是金融市場的波動性，而非實體經(jīng)濟的波動性。事實上，就像2007年一樣，當市場波動性指標最低時，實際宏觀經(jīng)濟風險可能最高。）

2016年8月24日《華爾街日報》專欄

「The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking – Its Models are Unreliable, its Policies Erratic and its Guidance Confusing. It is also Politically Vulnerable」

"The conduct of monetary policy in recent years has been deeply flawed… A robust reform agenda requires more rigorous review of recent policy choices and significant changes in the Fed's tools, strategies, communications and governance." （近年來貨幣政策的執(zhí)行存在嚴重缺陷……一個強有力的改革議程需要對近期政策選擇進行更嚴格的審查，以及對美聯(lián)儲的工具、策略、溝通和治理進行重大改變。）

"Two major obstacles must be overcome: groupthink within the academic economics guild, and the reluctance of central bankers to cede their new power." （必須克服兩個主要障礙：學術(shù)經(jīng)濟學行會內(nèi)部的群體思維，以及央行家不愿放棄其新權(quán)力。）

"The Fed often treats financial markets as a beast to be tamed, a cub to be coddled, or a market to be manipulated. It appears in thrall to financial markets, and financial markets are in thrall to the Fed, but only one will get the last word." （美聯(lián)儲常常把金融市場當作一頭需要馴服的野獸、一只需要寵溺的幼崽、或一個需要操縱的市場。它似乎被金融市場所奴役，而金融市場也被美聯(lián)儲所奴役，但只有一方會有最后發(fā)言權(quán)。）

"A simple, troubling fact: From the beginning of 2008 to the present, more than half of the increase in the value of the S&P 500 occurred on the day of Federal Open Market Committee decisions." （一個簡單而令人不安的事實：從2008年初到現(xiàn)在，標普500指數(shù)價值增長的一半以上發(fā)生在聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會決策當天。）

"The groupthink gathers adherents even as its successes become harder to find. The guild tightens its grip when it should open its mind to new data sources, new analytics, new economic models, new communication strategies, and a new paradigm for policy." （群體思維不斷吸引追隨者，即使其成功變得越來越難找。行會在應(yīng)該向新數(shù)據(jù)源、新分析方法、新經(jīng)濟模型、新溝通策略和新政策范式敞開心扉時卻收緊了控制。）

關(guān)于職能蔓延：

"Real reform should reverse the trend that makes the Fed a general purpose agency of government. Many guild members believe that central bankers—nonpartisan, high-minded experts—are particularly well-suited to expand their policy remit." （真正的改革應(yīng)該扭轉(zhuǎn)使美聯(lián)儲成為政府通用機構(gòu)的趨勢。許多行會成員認為，央行家——無黨派、高尚的專家——特別適合擴大其政策職權(quán)范圍。）

2017年《華爾街日報》專欄

建議將通脹目標從2%降至1%-2%區(qū)間：

"When the broader trends begin to turn — for example, in labor markets or output — the Fed should take account of the new prevailing signal." （當更廣泛的趨勢開始轉(zhuǎn)變——例如勞動力市場或產(chǎn)出——美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該考慮新的主導(dǎo)信號。）

提出"趨勢依賴"（trend dependence）取代"數(shù)據(jù)依賴"（data dependence）。

2018年與Bernanke同臺回顧QE

"My overriding concern about continued QE, then and now, involves the misallocations of capital in the economy and the misallocation of responsibility in our government." （我對持續(xù)QE的首要擔憂，過去如此現(xiàn)在亦然，涉及經(jīng)濟中的資本錯配和政府中的責任錯配。）

"Misallocations seldom operate under their own name. They choose other names to hide behind. They tend to linger for years in plain sight. Until they emerge with force at the most inauspicious of times and do unexpected harm to the economy." （錯配很少以自己的名義運作。它們選擇其他名稱來隱藏。它們往往在眾目睽睽之下徘徊多年。直到它們在最不吉利的時刻以力量涌現(xiàn)，對經(jīng)濟造成意想不到的傷害。）

關(guān)于Volcker的軼事（Warsh多次復(fù)述）

被提名美聯(lián)儲理事前拜訪Volcker：

"He said, Kevin, there's something I need to tell you. This job you're signing up for, really is quite simple. It really only requires two things." （他說，Kevin，有件事我需要告訴你。你要簽約的這份工作，其實很簡單。它真的只需要兩件事。）

（Warsh說他當時拿出筆和本子準備記下——但從未透露Volcker具體說了什么。）

八、2025年：重返公眾視野

2025年4月25日「Central Banking at a Crossroads」演講（G30/IMF）

完整演講稿關(guān)鍵段落：

開場：

"I cannot think of a time of greater economic consequence since 1980…some may believe the biggest threat to our economy comes from outsiders who seek to change the status quo…I don't agree…I believe the predominant risk comes from choices made inside the four walls of our most important economic institutions." （我想不到自1980年以來有比現(xiàn)在更具經(jīng)濟重要性的時刻……有些人可能認為我們經(jīng)濟面臨的最大威脅來自那些試圖改變現(xiàn)狀的外部人士……我不同意……我認為主要風險來自我們最重要經(jīng)濟機構(gòu)四面墻內(nèi)做出的選擇。）

關(guān)于機構(gòu)信任：

"To be trusted, economic institutions must be trustworthy. To be trustworthy, they must prove themselves competent." （要被信任，經(jīng)濟機構(gòu)必須值得信任。要值得信任，它們必須證明自己有能力。）

"Economic institutions must also maintain epistemic humility—that is, accepting that knowledge, even great knowledge, has its limits." （經(jīng)濟機構(gòu)還必須保持認識論上的謙卑——也就是說，承認知識，即使是偉大的知識，也有其局限性。）

關(guān)于危機時期：

"Nothing about the period was easy. We made good calls and mistakes, both. Inevitably, the hardest question then—and the most salient now—was the Fed's role and responsibility." （那段時期沒有任何事情是容易的。我們做出了正確的決定，也犯了錯誤。不可避免地，當時最難的問題——也是現(xiàn)在最突出的問題——是美聯(lián)儲的角色和責任。）

引用Volcker的警告：

"After one particularly intense weekend that resulted in extraordinary policy support, former Chairman Paul Volcker commented: The Fed had gone 'to the very edge of its lawful and implied power, transcending certain long embedded central banking principles and practices.' We took that as the equivalent of a brushback pitch—high and tight—from a strong institutional ally to his successors." （在一個特別緊張的周末導(dǎo)致非常規(guī)政策支持之后，前主席保羅·沃爾克評論說：美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)走到了'其合法和隱含權(quán)力的最邊緣，超越了某些長期嵌入的央行原則和慣例。'我們把這當作相當于一個強有力的制度盟友對其繼任者發(fā)出的警告球——又高又緊。）

"But Volcker's warning has gone largely unheeded, even to this day." （但沃爾克的警告在很大程度上被忽視了，甚至直到今天。）

核心批評：

"In my view, forays far afield—for all seasons and all reasons—have led to systematic errors in the conduct of macroeconomic policy." （在我看來，各種場合、各種理由的越界遠征——導(dǎo)致了宏觀經(jīng)濟政策執(zhí)行中的系統(tǒng)性錯誤。）

"The Fed has acted more as a general-purpose agency of government than a narrow central bank. Institutional drift has coincided with the Fed's failure to satisfy an essential part of its statutory remit, price stability. It has also contributed to an explosion of federal spending. And the Fed's outsized role and underperformance have weakened the important and worthy case for monetary policy independence." （美聯(lián)儲更像是政府的通用機構(gòu)，而非狹義的央行。制度漂移與美聯(lián)儲未能滿足其法定職責的核心部分——價格穩(wěn)定——同時發(fā)生。它還導(dǎo)致了聯(lián)邦支出的爆炸式增長。美聯(lián)儲過大的角色和表現(xiàn)不佳削弱了貨幣政策獨立性這一重要而有價值的論點。）

關(guān)于"快餐式"政策：

"Frequent changes to the Fed's metrics—including its professed preferred measures of inflation—are beneath the high standing of the central bank." （美聯(lián)儲指標的頻繁變化——包括其聲稱的首選通脹指標——有損央行的崇高地位。）

"I do not find the current Fed policy of 'data dependence' of much real value. We should care little about two numbers to the right of the decimal point in the latest government release. Breathlessly awaiting trailing data from stale national accounts—subject to significant, subsequent revision—is evidence of false precision and analytic complacency." （我認為美聯(lián)儲當前的"數(shù)據(jù)依賴"政策沒有多少實際價值。我們不應(yīng)該太在意最新政府發(fā)布數(shù)據(jù)小數(shù)點后的兩位數(shù)字。屏息等待陳舊國民賬戶的滯后數(shù)據(jù)——這些數(shù)據(jù)會經(jīng)歷重大的后續(xù)修訂——是虛假精確和分析自滿的證據(jù)。）

"Near-term forecasting is another distracting Fed preoccupation. Economists are not immune to the frailties of human nature. Once policymakers reveal their economic forecast, they can become prisoners of their own words." （近期預(yù)測是美聯(lián)儲另一個分心的執(zhí)念。經(jīng)濟學家也無法免于人性的弱點。一旦政策制定者透露他們的經(jīng)濟預(yù)測，他們就可能成為自己言語的囚徒。）

"Forward-guidance—a tool rolled out to great fanfare in the financial crisis—has little role to play in normal times. Moving markets with rolling Fed incantations is tempting, but unhelpful." （前瞻性指引——在金融危機中大張旗鼓推出的工具——在正常時期幾乎沒有作用。用滾動的美聯(lián)儲咒語來撬動市場是誘人的，但沒有幫助。）

"The central bank should find new comfort in working without applause and without the audience at the edge of its seats." （央行應(yīng)該在沒有掌聲、沒有觀眾屏息以待的情況下工作，并從中找到新的舒適。）

關(guān)于財政主導(dǎo)：

"I struggle to absolve the Fed of the nation's fiscal profligacy. Fed leaders encouraged government spending when times were tough, a few years back. But did not call for fiscal discipline at the time of sustained growth and full employment." （我很難免除美聯(lián)儲對國家財政揮霍的責任。幾年前，在困難時期，美聯(lián)儲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人鼓勵政府支出。但在持續(xù)增長和充分就業(yè)時期卻沒有呼吁財政紀律。）

"The Fed has been the most important buyer of US treasury debt—and other liabilities backed by the US government—since 2008. The Fed's $7 trillion balance sheet is nearly an order of magnitude larger than the day I joined." （自2008年以來，美聯(lián)儲一直是美國國債——以及其他由美國政府支持的債務(wù)——最重要的買家。美聯(lián)儲7萬億美元的資產(chǎn)負債表幾乎比我加入時大了一個數(shù)量級。）

關(guān)于QE：

"I strongly supported this crisis-time innovation, then and now. But when the crisis ended, the Fed never retraced its steps." （我強烈支持這種危機時期的創(chuàng)新，過去如此現(xiàn)在亦然。但當危機結(jié)束時，美聯(lián)儲從未收回它的腳步。）

"I worried mightily in the summer and fall of 2010—a time of strong growth and financial stability—that the decision to buy more treasury bonds—would involve the Fed in the messy political business of fiscal policy. QE2 was announced. I disagreed with the decision, and resigned from the Fed soon after." （我在2010年夏秋——一個增長強勁、金融穩(wěn)定的時期——非常擔心購買更多國債的決定會讓美聯(lián)儲卷入財政政策的混亂政治事務(wù)中。QE2宣布了。我不同意這個決定，不久后便辭去了美聯(lián)儲的職務(wù)。）

"QE—with some fits and starts in the 2010s—has become a near permanent feature of central bank power and policy. Fiscal policymakers—that is, elected members of Congress—found it considerably easier appropriating money knowing that the government's financing costs would be subsidized by the central bank." （QE——在2010年代有些起起落落——已經(jīng)成為央行權(quán)力和政策幾乎永久的特征。財政政策制定者——即國會當選成員——發(fā)現(xiàn)，知道政府的融資成本將由央行補貼，撥款變得容易多了。）

關(guān)于貨幣主導(dǎo)vs財政主導(dǎo)：

"Fiscal dominance—where the nation's debts constrain monetary policymakers—was long thought by economists to be a possible end-state. My view is that monetary dominance—where the central bank becomes the ultimate arbiter of fiscal policy—is the clearer and more present danger."

（財政主導(dǎo)——即國家債務(wù)約束貨幣政策制定者——長期以來被經(jīng)濟學家認為是一種可能的最終狀態(tài)。我的觀點是，貨幣主導(dǎo)——即央行成為財政政策的最終仲裁者——是更清晰、更現(xiàn)實的危險。）

關(guān)于"經(jīng)濟印記"理論：

"I proffer a theory of economic imprinting whereby the policy choices of prior periods make the economy more vulnerable to shocks and less able to adjust organically. Each time the Fed jumps into action, the more it expands its size and scope, encroaching further on other macroeconomic domains. More debt is accumulated…more capital is misallocated…more institutional lines are crossed…risks of future shocks are magnified…and the Fed is compelled to act even more aggressively the next time." （我提出一個"經(jīng)濟印記"理論，即先前時期的政策選擇使經(jīng)濟更容易受到?jīng)_擊，更難以有機調(diào)整。每次美聯(lián)儲跳入行動，它擴大規(guī)模和范圍的程度就越大，進一步侵入其他宏觀經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域。更多債務(wù)積累……更多資本錯配……更多制度界限被跨越……未來沖擊的風險被放大……美聯(lián)儲被迫下次采取更激進的行動。）

"Simply stated, path dependency is driving policy. We need to be careful that it's not driving into a ditch." （簡單說，路徑依賴正在驅(qū)動政策。我們需要小心它不會駛?cè)霚侠?。?/p>

關(guān)于氣候和多元化：

"'Climate change' and 'inclusion' are politically-charged issues. People of good conscience have their own views and motivations. Elected officials are tasked with evaluating data, synthesizing views, charting policy, and granting authority, if desired, to executive branch agencies. The Fed, however, has neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make political judgments in these areas. The Fed's remit is not a suggestion. Or a jumping off point." （"氣候變化"和"多元化"是政治化的議題。有良知的人有自己的觀點和動機。當選官員的任務(wù)是評估數(shù)據(jù)、綜合觀點、制定政策，并在需要時授權(quán)行政部門機構(gòu)。然而，美聯(lián)儲既沒有專業(yè)知識也沒有特權(quán)在這些領(lǐng)域做出政治判斷。美聯(lián)儲的職權(quán)范圍不是建議，也不是跳板。）

引用最高法院判例：

"As Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear, Congress is not in the business of hiding elephants in mouseholes." （正如最高法院判例明確指出的，國會不是在老鼠洞里藏大象的行當。）

關(guān)于通脹：

"The intellectual errors that contributed to the Great Inflation include some mix of the following: the central bank came to believe that its price stability objective was largely self-executing…that big, black-box DSGE models were anchored in reality…that monetary policy had nothing to do with money…that the central bank was a bystander to forces outside of its control…that the surge of Putin and the pandemic were blameworthy for inflation rather than the surge of government spending and printing." （導(dǎo)致大通脹的智識錯誤包括以下某種組合：央行開始相信其價格穩(wěn)定目標在很大程度上是自我執(zhí)行的……那些大型黑箱DSGE模型植根于現(xiàn)實……貨幣政策與貨幣無關(guān)……央行是其控制之外力量的旁觀者……普京崛起和疫情應(yīng)為通脹負責，而非政府支出和印鈔的激增。）

"Stable prices were the Fed's plot armor. Like in the movies, it was protection for the protagonist against those who would dare a challenge. The Fed's roving remit and grand ambitions, however, expanded its surface area and exposed its vulnerability even more." （穩(wěn)定的價格是美聯(lián)儲的主角光環(huán)。就像電影里一樣，它是對敢于挑戰(zhàn)者的主角的保護。然而，美聯(lián)儲游移的職權(quán)范圍和宏大抱負擴大了其暴露面積，使其更加脆弱。）

關(guān)于獨立性：

"Central bank independence is more often cited than defined. Independence is not a policy goal unto itself. It's a means of achieving certain important and particular policy outcomes." （央行獨立性被引用的次數(shù)多于被定義的次數(shù)。獨立性本身不是政策目標。它是實現(xiàn)某些重要和特定政策結(jié)果的手段。）

"'Independence' is reflexively declared when any Fed policy is criticized. Congress has granted important functions to the Fed, for example, in bank regulation and supervision. I do not believe the Fed is owed any particular deference in bank regulatory and supervisory policy." （每當美聯(lián)儲政策受到批評時，"獨立性"就會被條件反射式地宣稱。國會授予了美聯(lián)儲重要職能，例如銀行監(jiān)管。我不認為在銀行監(jiān)管政策方面美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該得到任何特別的尊重。）

"I strongly believe in the operational independence of monetary policy as a wise political economy decision. And I believe that Fed independence is chiefly up to the Fed." （我堅信貨幣政策的操作獨立性是一個明智的政治經(jīng)濟決定。我相信美聯(lián)儲的獨立性主要取決于美聯(lián)儲自己。）

"That does not mean central bankers should be treated as pampered princes. When the monetary outcomes are poor, the Fed should be subjected to serious questioning, strong oversight, and, when they err, opprobrium." （這并不意味著央行家應(yīng)該被當作嬌生慣養(yǎng)的王子對待。當貨幣結(jié)果不佳時，美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該受到嚴肅質(zhì)疑、強有力的監(jiān)督，當他們犯錯時，應(yīng)該受到譴責。）

關(guān)于美聯(lián)儲的歷史：

"A narrow central bank has more going for it than mere tradition. Our constitutional republic is accepting of an independent central bank, only if it sticks closely to its congressionally directed duty and successfully performs its tasks. Ours is, after all, our third experiment with a central bank…not because of the success of its predecessors, but their failure." （狹義央行的優(yōu)勢不僅僅是傳統(tǒng)。我們的憲政共和國接受獨立央行，前提是它緊密堅持國會指定的職責并成功執(zhí)行其任務(wù)。畢竟，我們的央行是第三次實驗……不是因為其前任的成功，而是因為它們的失敗。）

"We should remember that the revealed preference of the body politic is a deep distaste for inflation—and also, for bailouts and power grabs." （我們應(yīng)該記住，政治體制的顯示偏好是對通脹的深深厭惡——同樣也是對救助和權(quán)力攫取的厭惡。）

核心治理原則：

"The governance objective is clear: it's to make the central bank safe for democracy, not to make democracy safe for the central bank." （治理目標是明確的：是讓央行對民主安全，而不是讓民主對央行安全。）

結(jié)論：

"The Fed's current wounds are largely self-inflicted, and its plot armor is showing its wear. A strategic reset is necessary to mitigate losses of credibility, changes in standing, and most important—worse economic outcomes for our fellow citizens." （美聯(lián)儲當前的傷口在很大程度上是自己造成的，其主角光環(huán)正在顯示磨損。有必要進行戰(zhàn)略重置，以減輕信譽損失、地位變化，以及最重要的——我們同胞更糟糕的經(jīng)濟結(jié)果。）

"Central bankers are trained to be careful with our critiques, lest the daylight reveal the magic. A bigger risk, however, is that of the sorcerer's apprentice: the misuse of magical powers producing trouble." （央行家被訓(xùn)練要謹慎對待我們的批評，以免陽光暴露魔術(shù)。然而，更大的風險是巫師學徒的風險：濫用魔法力量制造麻煩。）

"We should be unworried about violating pieties, prepared to endure periodic frowns of disapproval. It's high time we reclaim intellectual freedom and get policy back on track." （我們不應(yīng)該擔心違反虔誠，要準備好忍受周期性的不滿皺眉?，F(xiàn)在是我們收復(fù)知識自由、讓政策回歸正軌的時候了。）

"Central bank legitimacy demands nothing less." （央行的合法性要求如此，不能少于此。）

2025年5月28日 Hoover Institution Uncommon Knowledge采訪

"You keep printing a trillion here and a trillion there. It's gonna catch up to you, Peter." （你在這里印一萬億，在那里印一萬億。這會追上你的，Peter。）

"When the Federal Reserve prints trillions, especially in benign times, it changes everything. And it almost is a signal to the rest of Congress we're doing it and so can you." （當美聯(lián)儲印刷數(shù)萬億美元，尤其是在良好時期，它會改變一切。它幾乎是在向國會其他部門發(fā)出信號：我們在這樣做，你也可以。）

關(guān)于QE1支持但后續(xù)反對：

"I supported it, and I supported it with many colleagues under the view of we're gonna put this very dangerous, risky stuff back behind the covered glass until there's another crisis. We really never did that." （我支持它，我和許多同事一起支持它，基于這樣的看法：我們要把這些非常危險、有風險的東西放回玻璃罩后面，直到另一場危機到來。我們從未真正這樣做。）

"So the story you are going to tell about the subsequent QEs during a period that I would say was reasonably strong growth, reasonably stable financial markets, reasonable periods of stable prices, we start doing it for all seasons and all reasons, and in so doing we raise the bar for when another crisis hits. Because whatever you were doing couldn't possibly be enough." （所以你要講的關(guān)于后續(xù)QE的故事——在我認為是相當強勁增長、相當穩(wěn)定的金融市場、相當穩(wěn)定價格的時期——我們開始為各種季節(jié)、各種理由這樣做，這樣做我們提高了下次危機來臨時的門檻。因為無論你之前做了什么都不可能足夠。）

2025年7月13日 Fox News采訪

"The Fed has the policy mix exactly wrong—it has a big balance sheet, like we're in the '08 crisis or the 2020 pandemic, and has rates that are too high." （美聯(lián)儲的政策組合完全錯誤——它有一個大的資產(chǎn)負債表，就像我們處于08年危機或2020年疫情中一樣，而利率又太高。）

"It needs to shrink the Fed balance sheet and cut interest rates. In so doing, Main Street can get a much lower cost of credit." （它需要縮減美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表并降低利率。這樣，普通大街就能獲得更低的信貸成本。）

2025年7月17日 CNBC Squawk Box采訪

"We need regime change in the conduct of policy. The credibility deficit lies with the incumbents that are at the Fed, in my view." （我們需要在政策執(zhí)行中進行政權(quán)更迭。在我看來，信譽赤字在于美聯(lián)儲的現(xiàn)任者。）

"Their hesitancy to cut rates, I think, is actually quite a mark against them. The specter of the miss they made on inflation, it has stuck with them." （我認為，他們對降息的猶豫實際上是對他們相當不利的標記。他們在通脹上犯下的錯誤的幽靈一直纏繞著他們。）

"I think regime change at the Fed will happen in due course." （我認為美聯(lián)儲的政權(quán)更迭將在適當時候發(fā)生。）

關(guān)于Treasury-Fed協(xié)議：

"We need a new Treasury-Fed accord, like we did in 1951 after another period where we built up our nation's debt and we were stuck with a central bank that was working at cross purposes with the Treasury. That's the state of things now." （我們需要一個新的財政部-美聯(lián)儲協(xié)議，就像我們在1951年所做的那樣，當時也是在我們積累了國家債務(wù)、央行與財政部目標相悖的時期之后。這就是現(xiàn)在的情況。）

"If we have a new accord, then the Fed chair and the Treasury secretary can describe to markets plainly and with deliberation, 'This is our objective for the size of the Fed's balance sheet.'" （如果我們達成新協(xié)議，那么美聯(lián)儲主席和財政部長可以清晰而審慎地向市場描述，"這是我們對美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表規(guī)模的目標。"）

2025年9月 Hoover Conference

"There are many benefits of a smaller balance sheet, including better economic outcomes. We have two policy instruments, imperfect substitutes for each other, working sometimes at cross purposes, sometimes working together. But if the printing press could be quiet, you can have low policy rates." （較小的資產(chǎn)負債表有許多好處，包括更好的經(jīng)濟結(jié)果。我們有兩種政策工具，彼此不完美的替代品，有時相互矛盾，有時協(xié)同工作。但如果印鈔機可以安靜下來，你就可以有低政策利率。）

2025年11月《華爾街日報》專欄

「The Federal Reserve's Broken Leadership」

"Inflation is a choice, and the Fed's track record under Chairman Jerome Powell is one of unwise choices." （通脹是一種選擇，鮑威爾主席領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的美聯(lián)儲的記錄就是不明智選擇的記錄。）

"Americans would have higher pay and greater purchasing power if the Fed got its act together." （如果美聯(lián)儲振作起來，美國人會有更高的工資和更大的購買力。）

"AI will be a significant disinflationary force, increasing productivity and bolstering American competitiveness. Productivity improvements should drive significant increases in real take-home wages. A 1-percentage-point increase in annual productivity growth would double standards of living within a single generation." （AI將是一個顯著的反通脹力量，提高生產(chǎn)率并增強美國競爭力。生產(chǎn)率提高應(yīng)該推動實際稅后工資的顯著增長。年生產(chǎn)率增長提高1個百分點將使一代人內(nèi)的生活水平翻倍。）

"The Fed should abandon the dogma that inflation is caused when the economy grows too much and workers get paid too much." （美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該拋棄通脹是由于經(jīng)濟增長過快、工人工資過高造成的教條。）

"The Fed's bloated balance sheet, designed to support the biggest firms in a bygone crisis era, can be reduced significantly. That largesse can be redeployed in the form of lower interest rates to support households and small and medium-size businesses." （美聯(lián)儲臃腫的資產(chǎn)負債表——旨在支持過去危機時代的最大公司——可以大幅縮減。這種慷慨可以以較低利率的形式重新部署，以支持家庭和中小企業(yè)。）

"The cost of curiosity is approaching zero, owing to a new age of American innovation. And the rewards for curiosity are surging, thanks in large part to pro-growth policies championed by President Trump." （由于美國創(chuàng)新的新時代，好奇心的成本正在接近零。而好奇心的回報正在飆升，這在很大程度上要歸功于特朗普總統(tǒng)倡導(dǎo)的促增長政策。）*

— THE END —

紫京講談

財經(jīng)領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)作者

3367篇原創(chuàng)