梅里·馬達(dá)沙希：COP30大會(huì)閉幕，一個(gè)懸而未決的議題留給世界巨大的問號(hào)

IPP評(píng)論是國(guó)家高端智庫(kù)華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺(tái)。

當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間11月22日，第30次聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化大會(huì)（COP30）在巴西貝倫落幕。閉幕式上，COP30主席宣布通過新的氣候行動(dòng)總體協(xié)議，呼吁各國(guó)加速推進(jìn)氣候行動(dòng)。但令人關(guān)注的是，最終文本并未出現(xiàn)任何明確提及“化石燃料”的措辭，也未就煤、石油和天然氣的淘汰或減量路徑形成共識(shí)。在大會(huì)談判期間，歐盟曾與80多個(gè)國(guó)家共同推動(dòng)將“化石燃料淘汰路線圖”寫入?yún)f(xié)議，但遭到沙特阿拉伯、俄羅斯等主要產(chǎn)油國(guó)的反對(duì)。經(jīng)過多輪談判，歐盟最終選擇不阻撓協(xié)議通過，但明確表示不同意最終文本的內(nèi)容。

大會(huì)的氣氛也因關(guān)鍵參與者的缺席而顯得格外復(fù)雜。盡管本屆COP30吸引了190余國(guó)代表參會(huì)，但美國(guó)官方代表團(tuán)的再度缺席。在峰會(huì)尾聲，美國(guó)政府更是宣布美國(guó)沿海新區(qū)供油氣鉆探的新計(jì)劃。針對(duì)當(dāng)前國(guó)際氣候合作的困境，聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候負(fù)責(zé)人 Simon Stiell表示氣候懷疑論、內(nèi)部分歧與地緣政治緊張已對(duì)國(guó)際合作造成嚴(yán)重沖擊。

在IPP榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織國(guó)際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心顧問理事梅里·馬達(dá)沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）看來，COP30呈現(xiàn)出明顯的“進(jìn)退交織”。一方面，部分融資與適應(yīng)領(lǐng)域保持了多邊合作的框架；另一方面，在最關(guān)鍵的化石燃料議題上卻因產(chǎn)油國(guó)合力抵制而難有突破。美國(guó)首次缺席造成談判現(xiàn)場(chǎng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)真空，而適應(yīng)融資的擴(kuò)張某種程度上也是以削弱減排力度為代價(jià)。最終成果雖有亮點(diǎn)，卻遠(yuǎn)未達(dá)到應(yīng)對(duì)氣候緊迫性的行動(dòng)速度。

這一切共同指向一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問題：在地緣政治對(duì)立和發(fā)展道路分化加速的背景下，COP機(jī)制是否仍能維持其原有的效能？答案將深刻影響未來全球氣候治理的走向。

*本文作者：梅里·馬達(dá)沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織國(guó)際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問理事

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) ,South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of Advisory Board of UNESCO International Centre for Creative Economy and Sustainable Development（ICCSD）

正文

COP 30 會(huì)議閉幕——淘汰化石燃料的計(jì)劃仍不清晰

分裂世界中的氣候大會(huì)未來何去何從？

COP 30 ended - No clear plan to phase out fossil fuel

The Future of COPs in a Divided World

引言

Introduction

貝倫舉行的COP30落幕后，國(guó)際社會(huì)迎來了一個(gè)必須重新審視的時(shí)刻。此前輿論多將焦點(diǎn)放在談判過程本身。實(shí)際上，峰會(huì)最終的成果及其背后的政治選擇，更值得系統(tǒng)性地分析。

The conclusion of COP30 in Belém has prompted a moment of necessary reflection. While earlier analyses addressed the negotiations themselves, the final outcomes of the summit and the political choices embedded within them, warrant a more comprehensive examination.

COP30召開之際，全球正面臨愈發(fā)嚴(yán)峻的氣候沖擊、加速碎片化的地緣政治環(huán)境，以及國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)化石能源、氣候融資和韌性建設(shè)采取更果斷行動(dòng)的強(qiáng)烈期待。距離2030年可持續(xù)發(fā)展目標(biāo)僅剩五年，這場(chǎng)峰會(huì)因此被普遍視為一場(chǎng)“壓力測(cè)試”——國(guó)際社會(huì)是否能夠真正把先前的承諾轉(zhuǎn)化為可執(zhí)行的方案和路徑？

COP30 unfolded amid intensifying climate impacts, rising geopolitical fragmentation, and heightened expectations for decisive action on fossil fuels, climate finance, and resilience. Positioned at a critical juncture, just five years before the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal deadline, the summit was widely viewed as a test of whether the international community could convert prior commitments into actionable pathways.

然而，COP30并不僅僅為年度氣候外交畫上一個(gè)句號(hào)；它更呈現(xiàn)出一幅關(guān)于全球氣候治理走向、局限與動(dòng)態(tài)變化的圖景。盡管大會(huì)在氣候適應(yīng)（Adaptation）、健康韌性 （health resilience）和森林融資（forest finance）等領(lǐng)域取得了進(jìn)展，但最終協(xié)議卻刻意避開了化石燃料這一全球排放的核心問題。“有所突破”與“刻意回避”并存的結(jié)構(gòu)性矛盾，將深刻影響未來的氣候合作。

Yet COP30 did not merely close a chapter in annual climate diplomacy; it offered a revealing snapshot of the direction, limitations, and evolving dynamics of global climate governance. Although governments celebrated progress on adaptation, health resilience, and forest finance, the final agreement notably avoided direct reference to fossil fuels, the core driver of global emissions. This interlinkage of innovation and omission illustrates the structural tensions that will shape the future of climate cooperation.

在地緣政治持續(xù)碎片化的背景下，COP30也提出了一個(gè)更加迫切的問題：氣候大會(huì)是否仍具備推動(dòng)體系性脫碳的能力，抑或正在轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橹荒堋肮芾怼倍鵁o法真正化解危機(jī)的場(chǎng)合？

In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, COP30 raised an urgent question: Are COP negotiations still capable of driving systemic decarbonization, or are they becoming forums that manage rather than resolve the climate crisis?

本文將分析貝倫成果的深層影響，梳理COP30的成就與不足，并探討其可能為下一階段氣候外交留下了怎樣的“遺產(chǎn)”。

This article analyses the implications of the Belém outcome, assessing what COP30 achieved, where it fell short, and what its legacy may signal for the next phase of climate diplomacy.

作為《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》體系關(guān)鍵節(jié)點(diǎn)的COP30

COP30 as a Critical Moment in the UNFCCC Regime

在貝倫舉行的COP30肩負(fù)著兩大使命：一是推動(dòng)各國(guó)進(jìn)一步提升減排雄心，二是重建外界對(duì)多邊氣候治理的信心。在COP28僅給出“逐步遠(yuǎn)離化石燃料”的模糊表述之后，外界期待COP30能夠拿出一份更具操作性的路線圖——包含明確的時(shí)間表、重點(diǎn)行業(yè)基準(zhǔn)以及關(guān)鍵節(jié)點(diǎn)，從而縮小全球減排的缺口。

Hosted in Belém , a symbolic gateway to the Amazon , COP30 carried the dual mandate of accelerating mitigation ambition and restoring confidence in multilateral environmental governance. After COP28’s ambiguous commitment to “transition away from fossil fuels,” Parties hoped COP30 would deliver a concrete roadmap with timelines, sectoral benchmarks, and milestones to close the emissions gap.

各方對(duì)本屆大會(huì)寄予厚望，希望其能夠重新確認(rèn)“貝倫1.5°C目標(biāo)”，在2030年前加快重點(diǎn)部門減排，提出可信的凈零路徑，并推出“巴庫(kù)至貝倫1.3萬億美元路線圖”（COP29主席國(guó)阿塞拜疆與COP30主席國(guó)巴西聯(lián)合推出的一份氣候融資路線圖。核心目標(biāo)是到2035年，每年為發(fā)展中國(guó)家動(dòng)員至少1.3萬億美元的氣候資金）相匹配的融資框架。相關(guān)規(guī)劃旨在整合多元資金來源，通過新的融資目標(biāo)優(yōu)先支持適應(yīng)工作，并設(shè)置可量化的指標(biāo)以跟蹤整體進(jìn)展。

Expectations were high: a renewed commitment to the 1.5°C goal, accelerated sector-specific mitigation strategies before 2030, a credible pathway to net-zero, and an integrated finance framework aligned with the proposed Baku–Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 Trillion. The roadmap sought to integrate different finance sources, prioritize adaptation through a new finance goal, and introduce measurable indicators for monitoring progress.

然而，真正進(jìn)入談判階段后，這些期待迅速被各方的結(jié)構(gòu)性分歧所取代。由沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯國(guó)家集團(tuán)、俄羅斯及若干立場(chǎng)相近的發(fā)展中國(guó)家組成的反對(duì)陣營(yíng)，在削弱乃至稀釋最終文本方面發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。他們的表態(tài)反映出一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期存在的矛盾：減排雄心、國(guó)際公平與各自經(jīng)濟(jì)利益之間，始終存在難以調(diào)和的結(jié)構(gòu)性張力。

In practice, however, negotiations exposed profound divisions. A coalition of opposition actors, led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Group, Russia, and several like-minded developing countries played a decisive role in moderating and ultimately weakening the outcome text. Their interventions reveal longstanding tensions between mitigation ambition, equity, and national economic interests.

巴西曾努力推動(dòng)一份兼具平衡和前瞻性的議程，但整個(gè)會(huì)議仍深受地緣政治碎片化與化石燃料利益固化的制約。盡管相關(guān)國(guó)家將立場(chǎng)包裝為“公平”或“技術(shù)中立”，但產(chǎn)油國(guó)的集體態(tài)度實(shí)際上對(duì)任何具有約束力的化石燃料承諾形成了事實(shí)性否決。最終協(xié)議的文本只能保留“推動(dòng)能源系統(tǒng)轉(zhuǎn)型”和“擴(kuò)大可再生能源”的措辭，而對(duì)“逐步淘汰化石燃料”的明確表述則被完全刪除。

Brazil attempted to broker a balanced, forward-looking agenda, but the conference remained constrained by geopolitical fragmentation and entrenched fossil-fuel interests. While framed in terms of equity and technological neutrality, the collective stance of oil-producing economies operated as a veto against binding fossil-fuel commitments. As a result, references to “transitioning energy systems” and renewables were retained, but explicit fossil-fuel phase-out language was removed.

反對(duì)方的政治動(dòng)態(tài)

The Political Dynamics of Opposition

沙特阿拉伯及阿拉伯國(guó)家集團(tuán)的立場(chǎng)，雖然以“公平”和“發(fā)展”為理由，但在談判實(shí)踐中卻成為阻擋任何實(shí)質(zhì)性油氣減量承諾的事實(shí)性否決。他們堅(jiān)持“技術(shù)中立”，并強(qiáng)調(diào)以碳捕集（通過技術(shù)手段捕獲并處理二氧化碳的系統(tǒng)）等技術(shù)為主的減排路徑，反映出在科學(xué)已明確要求快速、結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)型的當(dāng)下，這些國(guó)家仍試圖延長(zhǎng)對(duì)化石燃料依賴的考量。

The positions advanced by Saudi Arabia and the Arab Group, though framed as matters of equity and development, functioned in practice as de facto vetoes against any meaningful commitment to phase down oil and gas. Their insistence on technological neutrality and carbon-capture-driven strategies reflected a strategic effort to prolong hydrocarbon dependence at a moment when science demands rapid structural transformation.

在化石能源生產(chǎn)國(guó)、新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體與高度脆弱國(guó)家之間的博弈，成為COP30最突出的僵局之一。最終文本也清晰呈現(xiàn)了這種張力：一方面強(qiáng)調(diào)“推動(dòng)能源系統(tǒng)轉(zhuǎn)型”和擴(kuò)大可再生能源規(guī)模；另一方面，卻刻意避開產(chǎn)油國(guó)最敏感的表述。

The clash between hydrocarbon producers, emerging economies, and climate-vulnerable nations produced one of COP30’s most visible impasses. The final text reflects these tensions: strong references to “transitioning energy systems” and advancing renewables, but carefully avoiding terms seen as politically toxic by oil-exporting countries.

沙特阿拉伯的反對(duì)并非單純的阻撓，而是基于一套自洽的戰(zhàn)略邏輯：他們認(rèn)為快速淘汰化石能源既不公平、技術(shù)條件尚未成熟，也可能引發(fā)地緣政治震蕩。因此，沙特主張以技術(shù)路線作為轉(zhuǎn)型主軸，特別是推動(dòng)“循環(huán)碳經(jīng)濟(jì)”（Circular Carbon Economy）框架，通過碳捕集、再利用等手段減排，而不是直接削減化石燃料開采量。這一模式使能源生產(chǎn)國(guó)能夠在維持化石燃料驅(qū)動(dòng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)，投入發(fā)展低排放技術(shù)。

Saudi Arabia’s opposition was not merely obstruction but part of a coherent worldview: a belief that rapid fossil phase-outs are inequitable, technologically premature, and geopolitically destabilizing. Saudi Arabia promoted a technological approach to the transition, specifically the Circular Carbon Economy framework, emphasizing carbon capture, reuse, and removal rather than the elimination of fossil fuel extraction. This approach enables producer economies to maintain hydrocarbon-based growth while investing in low-emissions technologies.

在阿拉伯國(guó)家集團(tuán)的協(xié)調(diào)下，COP30最終未能就具有約束力的化石能源減排承諾達(dá)成一致——即便小島嶼發(fā)展中國(guó)家（SIDS）、歐盟以及部分拉美國(guó)家多次施壓也無力扭轉(zhuǎn)結(jié)果。沙特的立場(chǎng)背后是一套明確的政策邏輯：拒絕任何形式的“逐步淘汰”表述，主張以碳捕集、氫能等“低排放技術(shù)”為主的路徑；強(qiáng)調(diào)能源安全和各國(guó)國(guó)情差異；反對(duì)對(duì)化石燃料采取不對(duì)稱政策。這種做法既延續(xù)了化石能源驅(qū)動(dòng)的發(fā)展模式，又通過投資減排技術(shù)在事實(shí)上延長(zhǎng)了油氣產(chǎn)業(yè)的生命周期。

The Arab Group’s coordinated interventions ensured that COP30—despite pressure from Small Island Developping States (SIDS), the EU, and several Latin American states—could not reach consensus on binding fossil reduction commitments.Saudi Arabia’s position was anchored in a coherent policy framework: rejection of explicit phase-out commitments, promotion of “l(fā)ow-emission technologies” such as carbon capture and hydrogen, emphasis on energy security and national circumstances, and resistance to any asymmetric treatment of fossil fuels. This approach supports hydrocarbon-based development while investing in mitigation technologies, effectively extending the lifespan of oil and gas.

其他行為體——包括非阿拉伯的化石燃料生產(chǎn)國(guó)以及非洲集團(tuán)部分成員——也因?yàn)榻?jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)化石能源的依賴、就業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型的壓力，以及對(duì)能源可及性和外部附加條件的擔(dān)憂，而傾向支持更弱化的表述。在這樣的談判格局下，小島嶼發(fā)展中國(guó)家（SIDS）、最不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家（LDCs）以及眾多非洲脆弱國(guó)家，不得不面對(duì)遠(yuǎn)超其自身談判能力的政治力量。

Other actors, including non-Arab fossil producers and parts of the African Group, supported diluted commitments for reasons ranging from economic dependency and employment transitions to concerns over energy access and conditionality. In this environment, vulnerable states SIDS, LDCs, and many African nations found themselves confronting political forces far larger than their negotiating power.

共識(shí)規(guī)則進(jìn)一步放大了這些差異。反對(duì)方借助程序性的“阻斷”威脅來迫使各方讓步，從而主導(dǎo)了最終文本的形成。他們的籌碼為未來的COP主席國(guó)樹立了令人擔(dān)憂的先例，也凸顯了依賴共識(shí)的外交機(jī)制所固有的結(jié)構(gòu)性脆弱性。

The consensus rule amplified these dynamics. Opposition actors used the threat of blocking to secure concessions and shape the final text. Their leverage set a concerning precedent for future COP presidencies and highlighted the structural fragility of consensus-based diplomacy.

金融取舍與談判籌碼

Financial Trade-Offs and Bargaining Leverage

在談判過程中，部分國(guó)家對(duì)強(qiáng)有力的減緩（mitigation）表述的抵制，某些時(shí)候?qū)嶋H上被當(dāng)作一種談判籌碼，用以換取在適應(yīng)融資或?qū)嵤┌才派细欣慕Y(jié)果。雖然這種交換未被公開承認(rèn)，但從整體談判節(jié)奏來看，雙方之間確實(shí)形成了一種默契：以削弱減排承諾，換取在資金和執(zhí)行層面的更大靈活度。

Resistance to strong mitigation language appeared at times to function as bargaining leverage for securing more favorable outcomes on adaptation finance and implementation modalities. Although not explicitly acknowledged, negotiation dynamics suggested a tacit trade-off: mitigation ambition in exchange for financial flexibility.

這種動(dòng)態(tài)不僅削弱了整體減排議程，也強(qiáng)化了近年來愈發(fā)突出的趨勢(shì)——適應(yīng)和韌性領(lǐng)域的承諾不斷推進(jìn)，但相應(yīng)的減排進(jìn)展卻明顯滯后。

This dynamic contributed to the dilution of the mitigation agenda and reinforced a broader trend: while adaptation and resilience commitments advance, they increasingly do so without parallel progress on emissions reduction.

COP30 還受到美國(guó)缺席的深刻影響——這是近 30 年氣候談判中美國(guó)首次未出席。白宮在聲明中表示，美國(guó)不會(huì)為了“讓其他國(guó)家付出代價(jià)的模糊氣候目標(biāo)”而犧牲自身經(jīng)濟(jì)和國(guó)家安全。鑒于美國(guó)在歷史排放中的份額，其缺席在象征意義和實(shí)際推動(dòng)力上都造成了重要影響。

Absence of the United States and China’s Reserved Posture

COP30 was also shaped by the absence of the United States the first such absence in 30 years of climate negotiations. A statement from the White House noted that the administration would not jeopardize U.S. economic and national security in pursuit of what it termed “vague climate goalsthat are killing other countries.”. Given the United States’ historical contribution to global emissions, its absence carried weight both symbolically and substantively.

與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)也并未填補(bǔ)這一領(lǐng)導(dǎo)空缺。中方代表團(tuán)在會(huì)上保持相對(duì)謹(jǐn)慎，對(duì)減排、氣候融資以及是否支持巴西的森林保護(hù)計(jì)劃等關(guān)鍵議題都避免亮明態(tài)度。盡管中國(guó)通過雙邊渠道提供了大量氣候資金，但對(duì)于任何可能被解讀為需在聯(lián)合國(guó)框架下承擔(dān)正式出資義務(wù)的表述，中方始終保持保留。

China, meanwhile, did not step into the leadership vacuum. Its delegation maintained a reserved posture, avoiding strong positions on key issues ranging from emissions reduction to climate finance and contributions to Brazil’s anti-deforestation initiatives. While China provides extensive climate finance bilaterally, it resisted language that could imply an expectation of formalized contributions under UN processes.

美國(guó)的缺席疊加中國(guó)的謹(jǐn)慎，使會(huì)議現(xiàn)場(chǎng)形成了明顯的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)真空，不僅影響了整體談判的氛圍，也削弱了多個(gè)議題的推進(jìn)動(dòng)力。

This combination, U.S. absence and Chinese reticence, created a leadership void that shaped the tone of the negotiations and weakened momentum on several fronts.

巴西總統(tǒng)盧拉推出的旗艦項(xiàng)目“熱帶森林永續(xù)基金”（TFFF）同樣未能達(dá)到預(yù)期目標(biāo)。該項(xiàng)目原計(jì)劃籌集 250 億美元的公共資金，用于激勵(lì)各國(guó)保護(hù)熱帶森林，但截至?xí)诮Y(jié)束，僅獲得約 50 億美元的承諾，來自挪威、印度尼西亞、法國(guó)等少數(shù)國(guó)家。德國(guó)雖表示將很快出資，但尚未公布具體金額。

President Lula’s signature anti-deforestation initiative, the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, also fell far short of his ambitious goal of raising $25 billion in public financing that would essentially pay countries to protect forests. By the end of the talks, the program had received around $5 billion in pledges from a small handful of countries, including Norway, Indonesia and France, with Germany saying it would soon contribute an unspecified amount.

該基金的支付方式也并非傳統(tǒng)意義上的贈(zèng)款，而是依據(jù)各國(guó)所保護(hù)的熱帶及亞熱帶雨林面積核算，并通過衛(wèi)星數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證；若發(fā)現(xiàn)森林退化或砍伐，將按每公頃相應(yīng)扣減。

Payments are not in the form of grants and calibrated based on the area of standing tropical and subtropical rainforest each country conserves verified by satellite data. Deductions for each hectare degraded or deforested will be levid as per findings.

在此次談判中，中國(guó)在幾乎所有主要爭(zhēng)議點(diǎn)上都保持低調(diào)——無論是減排、為脆弱國(guó)家提供氣候資金，還是是否向巴西新設(shè)的森林保護(hù)基金出資，均未采取強(qiáng)硬立場(chǎng)。

China avoided strong positions on most, if not all, of the main sticking points at the talks: reducing emissions, providing money to help poorer countries cope with climate change and contributions to a new Brazilian fund aimed at stemming deforestation.

美國(guó)缺席與中國(guó)的審慎態(tài)度疊加，使本次大會(huì)在多個(gè)核心議題上缺乏明確推動(dòng)力，也進(jìn)一步凸顯了當(dāng)前全球氣候治理中的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)真空。

This combination U.S. absence and Chinese reticence created a leadership void that shaped the tone of the negotiations and weakened momentum on several fronts.

路線之爭(zhēng)

The Roadmap Debate

包括歐盟、英國(guó)以及多國(guó)拉美和太平洋國(guó)家在內(nèi)的 80 多個(gè)國(guó)家，都支持制定一份明確的化石燃料路線圖。他們認(rèn)為，如果沒有清晰的里程碑和時(shí)間表，COP將難以觸及氣候危機(jī)的根源。然而，阿拉伯國(guó)家集團(tuán)堅(jiān)決反對(duì)任何具有約束性的路線圖，最終使這一倡議無法通過。

More than 80 countries endorsed a detailed fossil-fuel roadmap, including the EU, UK, and many Latin American and Pacific nations. They argued that without clear milestones and timelines, the COP would fail to address the root cause of the climate crisis. However, the Arab Group rejected any roadmap with binding elements, preventing its adoption.

盡管最終文本未能納入路線圖內(nèi)容，巴西宣布仍將推動(dòng)一份關(guān)于化石燃料轉(zhuǎn)型和防止森林砍伐的自愿平行路線圖。哥倫比亞也提出將在2026年4月自愿承辦后續(xù)會(huì)議。這些動(dòng)向顯示，各國(guó)正嘗試在傳統(tǒng)共識(shí)機(jī)制之外，通過“小多邊合作”尋求新的突破路徑。

Although omitted from the final text, Brazil announced plans to advance voluntary, parallel roadmaps on fossil-fuel transition and deforestation. Colombia has volunteered to host a follow-up meeting in April 2026. These developments suggest a shift toward minilateral initiatives as Parties seek progress outside the constraints of consensus.

會(huì)議成果

The Conference Outcome

COP30同時(shí)展現(xiàn)了多邊氣候外交的韌性與局限性。此次峰會(huì)的結(jié)果揭示出一個(gè)清晰的現(xiàn)實(shí)：在當(dāng)前全球格局中，地緣政治與發(fā)展利益往往壓過科學(xué)提出的緊迫需求。這也意味著，邁向COP31乃至未來更長(zhǎng)周期的氣候進(jìn)程，世界迫切需要政治層面的創(chuàng)新與更有效的集體問責(zé)機(jī)制。

COP30 illustrates both the resilience and the limitations of multilateral climate diplomacy.The summit’s outcome reflected a global landscape where geopolitical and developmental interests often overshadow scientific urgency reinforcing the critical need for both political innovation and stronger collective accountability as the world moves toward COP31 and beyond.

總體而言，盡管大會(huì)在動(dòng)蕩的國(guó)際環(huán)境中推進(jìn)艱難，COP30仍取得了一些具有前瞻意義的成果，并催生了新的合作倡議，進(jìn)一步確認(rèn)了多邊氣候框架的核心地位。

In the final analysis, we must say that despite the turbulent landscape, COP30 achieved several forward-looking elements and generated new initiatives reaffirming the multilateral climate framework.

本次會(huì)議的結(jié)果可謂喜憂參半。一方面，適應(yīng)與氣候韌性議題取得了重要進(jìn)展，特別是在脆弱國(guó)家長(zhǎng)期呼吁的領(lǐng)域?qū)崿F(xiàn)了突破：到2035年將適應(yīng)融資提高三倍的決定，標(biāo)志著全球優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的重大調(diào)整，承認(rèn)了“保護(hù)易受影響社區(qū)”與“減少排放”同等重要。

It delivered a mixed outcome, combining important advances in adaptation and climate resilience with clear shortcomings on mitigation ambition. On the achievement side, the conference made substantial progress in areas where vulnerable countries have long demanded action. The decision to triple adaptation finance by 2035 marks a significant recalibration of global priorities, acknowledging that safeguarding communities is as urgent as reducing emissions.

與此同時(shí)，《貝倫健康行動(dòng)計(jì)劃》(Belém Health Action Plan, BHAP)的通過，使“氣候韌性衛(wèi)生體系”正式成為全球氣候行動(dòng)的關(guān)鍵支柱之一。森林保護(hù)方面也迎來新的動(dòng)力——“熱帶森林永續(xù)基金”的啟動(dòng)通過混合融資獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)熱帶森林保護(hù)，并配套推出海洋保護(hù)、數(shù)字創(chuàng)新和氣候智慧型農(nóng)業(yè)等相關(guān)倡議。在地緣政治裂痕日益加深的背景下，這些舉措在一定程度上維系了多邊合作的精神。

Likewise, the adoption of the Belém Health Action Plan, with broad endorsements and initial funding, positioned climate-resilient health systems as a central pillar of global climate action. Forest protection also gained momentum through the creation of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, which mobilizes blended finance to reward the preservation of tropical forests, alongside complementary initiatives targeting oceans, digital innovation, and climate-smart agriculture. These steps helped maintain a spirit of multilateral cooperation despite geopolitical fractures.

然而，COP30在最關(guān)鍵的長(zhǎng)期氣候穩(wěn)定議題上依然未能突破。最終協(xié)議未對(duì)“逐步淘汰化石燃料”作出任何明確承諾，而是將相關(guān)推進(jìn)留給聯(lián)合國(guó)體系之外的自愿機(jī)制。這一退讓，被普遍認(rèn)為與科學(xué)所要求的緊迫行動(dòng)明顯不符。

Yet COP30 fell short where it mattered most for long-term climate stabilization. The final agreement failed to deliver any explicit commitment to phase out fossil fuels, instead deferring to a voluntary process outside the UN framework a retreat widely viewed as inconsistent with scientific urgency.

會(huì)議成果還在一定程度上削弱了IPCC的權(quán)威性：將其評(píng)估報(bào)告與未經(jīng)同行評(píng)議的材料放在同等地位，使氣候談判賴以支撐的科學(xué)基礎(chǔ)受到動(dòng)搖。雖然融資承諾在數(shù)字上看似可觀，但在責(zé)任分擔(dān)、資金落實(shí)時(shí)間等核心問題上仍缺乏明確方案；多個(gè)倡議——尤其是與森林相關(guān)的項(xiàng)目——又過度依賴尚未成熟的市場(chǎng)機(jī)制和非約束性承諾。加上會(huì)務(wù)組織不力、與原住民群體的緊張關(guān)系等操作層面的問題，也進(jìn)一步影響了東道國(guó)進(jìn)程的公信力。

The outcome also diluted the authority of the IPCC, placing its assessments on equal footing with non-peer-reviewed material and weakening the scientific backbone of the negotiations. Financing pledges, while large in headline terms, lack clarity on burden-sharing and timelines, and several initiatives - notably on forests - rely heavily on untested market mechanisms and nonbinding promises. Operational shortcomings, including logistical failures and tensions with Indigenous groups, further undermined the credibility of the host process.

COP30的啟示

Conclusion

COP30召開之際，全球地緣政治進(jìn)一步分裂，氣候外交在戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、互信削弱以及各國(guó)發(fā)展優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)不斷分化的背景下展開。巴西試圖通過一系列將雨林保護(hù)、生物經(jīng)濟(jì)與全球脫碳相結(jié)合的倡議，在各方之間扮演“橋梁搭建者”的角色。然而，一小部分高度依賴化石燃料的經(jīng)濟(jì)體堅(jiān)決反對(duì)，使這些雄心勃勃的構(gòu)想難以真正落地。

COP30 convened at a moment of heightened geopolitical fragmentation, where climate diplomacy unfolded amid strategic rivalries, weakened trust, and diverging development priorities. Brazil sought to act as a bridge-builder through initiatives linking rainforest protection, bioeconomy development, and global decarbonization. However, opposition from a minority group of fossil-fuel-dependent economies significantly constrained the feasibility of these ambitions.

本次峰會(huì)凸顯了未來氣候外交面臨的核心難題：如何在化石能源依賴型經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展路徑與快速、系統(tǒng)性減排的緊迫需求之間求得平衡。盡管政治分歧趨于尖銳，但多邊合作的必要性仍不容忽視。COP30顯示，未來的氣候大會(huì)或許難以再達(dá)成全面性的宏大協(xié)議，但它們依舊是科學(xué)緊迫性與政治現(xiàn)實(shí)正面碰撞、展開博弈的關(guān)鍵場(chǎng)域。

The summit highlighted the central challenge facing future climate diplomacy: reconciling the development pathways of fossil-dependent economies with the urgent need for rapid, systemic emissions reductions. While the political divides were stark, the necessity of multilateral cooperation proved equally evident. COP30 demonstrated that, although future COPs may struggle to deliver sweeping agreements, they remain essential spaces where scientific urgency confronts political reality.

盡管如此，UNFCCC框架仍提供了必要的國(guó)際合法性、透明度和全球壓力機(jī)制。然而，如果主要排放國(guó)始終難以在關(guān)鍵議題上達(dá)成一致，未來的推進(jìn)只能在“最低共識(shí)”基礎(chǔ)上緩慢前行。COP30的經(jīng)驗(yàn)也提出了一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問題：在地緣競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、發(fā)展路徑分化加深的時(shí)代，COP機(jī)制還能繼續(xù)有效運(yùn)作嗎？

The UNFCCC process continues to provide legitimacy, transparency, and global pressure. Yet without alignment among major emitters, progress will be incremental and negotiated around the lowest common denominator. The experience of COP30 underscores a pivotal question: Can the COP process remain effective in an era defined by geopolitical rivalry and divergent development models?

這一問題的答案，不僅決定未來各屆COP的走向，也將深刻影響全球氣候治理體系的整體結(jié)構(gòu)。

The answer will shape not only future COPs but the architecture of global climate governance itself.

梅里·馬達(dá)沙希：COP30會(huì)是全球氣候治理的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)嗎？｜中英文對(duì)照

關(guān)于IPP

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）是一個(gè)獨(dú)立、非營(yíng)利性的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新與公共政策研究平臺(tái)。IPP圍繞中國(guó)的體制改革、社會(huì)政策、中國(guó)話語權(quán)與國(guó)際關(guān)系等開展一系列的研究工作，并在此基礎(chǔ)上形成知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策咨詢協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造開放式的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策研究平臺(tái)，成為領(lǐng)先世界的中國(guó)智庫(kù)。