期刊GPRI 2025年50卷第4期目錄與摘要｜保險(xiǎn)學(xué)術(shù)前沿

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期刊介紹：

“Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance- Issues and Practice”創(chuàng)刊于1976年，是日內(nèi)瓦協(xié)會(huì)主辦的一本國(guó)際學(xué)術(shù)期刊，聚焦保險(xiǎn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的前沿?zé)狳c(diǎn)問(wèn)題，旨在為保險(xiǎn)學(xué)術(shù)界和業(yè)界專(zhuān)業(yè)人士之間的交流提供橋梁，提升保險(xiǎn)業(yè)的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)。該刊為季刊，每年4期，每期發(fā)表文章10篇左右，2024年影響因子為2。

本期看點(diǎn)：

氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

●沒(méi)有顯著證據(jù)表明氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)促使保險(xiǎn)公司改進(jìn)其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理實(shí)踐，這導(dǎo)致氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)保險(xiǎn)公司績(jī)效產(chǎn)生顯著負(fù)面影響，且不利影響在規(guī)模較小、再保險(xiǎn)覆蓋率較低或業(yè)務(wù)地域集中度較高的保險(xiǎn)公司中更為突出。

雇主保險(xiǎn)

●實(shí)施補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃且投入較高的企業(yè)，其經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著低于未實(shí)施或低投入企業(yè)，其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)緩釋效應(yīng)在員工學(xué)歷較高的企業(yè)中更為顯著，主要通過(guò)提升員工留任率來(lái)降低經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

●雇主提供的團(tuán)體健康險(xiǎn)與壽險(xiǎn)，與車(chē)險(xiǎn)類(lèi)似，均采用經(jīng)驗(yàn)費(fèi)率定價(jià)法，但僅靠經(jīng)驗(yàn)費(fèi)率定價(jià)無(wú)法抑制福利過(guò)度消費(fèi)。

再保險(xiǎn)

●考察保險(xiǎn)公司與再保險(xiǎn)公司關(guān)系持續(xù)時(shí)間與承保績(jī)效之間的相關(guān)性，保險(xiǎn)公司需經(jīng)過(guò)約3年時(shí)間才能開(kāi)始實(shí)現(xiàn)再保險(xiǎn)關(guān)系的收益，長(zhǎng)期再保險(xiǎn)關(guān)系對(duì)承保業(yè)務(wù)具有重要意義。

●盡管普遍認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工具會(huì)提升公司實(shí)際杠桿率，但財(cái)產(chǎn)險(xiǎn)公司利用再保險(xiǎn)工具能夠顯著降低實(shí)際與目標(biāo)杠桿偏離度的絕對(duì)值。

董責(zé)險(xiǎn)

●購(gòu)買(mǎi)董責(zé)險(xiǎn)的企業(yè)更傾向于對(duì)研發(fā)支出進(jìn)行資本化處理，管理層的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)意愿是董責(zé)險(xiǎn)推動(dòng)研發(fā)資本化的關(guān)鍵路徑。

●在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，董責(zé)險(xiǎn)不僅作為市場(chǎng)工具，更成為高顯著度的政治合規(guī)信號(hào)，董責(zé)險(xiǎn)在非國(guó)有企業(yè)中未產(chǎn)生顯著影響。

※ 本期目錄

●Climate change, risk management, and firm performance: evidence from property-casualty insurers in China

●Tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship and underwriting performance: evidence from the US property-casualty insurance industry

●The impact of supplementary pension insurance programs on operational risk: insights from the perspective of employee retention

●Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and corporate R&D capitalisation: evidence from China

●How does directors’ and officers’ liability insurance affect the fulfilment of social responsibility by state-owned enterprises?

●Testing for moral hazard: a longitudinal examination of group life and health insurance in Taiwan

●Does reinsurance affect capital structure deviations? Evidence from US property–casualty insurers

Climate change, risk management, and firm performance: evidence from property-casualty insurers in China

氣候變化、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理與企業(yè)績(jī)效：基于中國(guó)財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)公司的實(shí)證證據(jù)

作者

Yugang Ding（廣東外語(yǔ)外貿(mào)大學(xué)），Jingwu Li（中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)）

摘要：We examine how climate risks affect the risk management and performance of property-casualty insurers. Our findings suggest that both short-term and long-term climate risks contribute to higher claim ratios at the city-insurer-year level. However, we find no significant evidence that climate risks prompt insurers to improve their risk management practices, such as increasing reinsurance ratios or adjusting geographic business distribution. As a result, climate risks have a substantial negative impact on insurers’ performance. This impact is primarily driven by claim ratios rather than operating expenses or investment returns. Furthermore, the adverse effects of climate risks are more pronounced for insurers with smaller size, lower reinsurance coverage, or more geographically concentrated business.

本文研究了氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)如何影響財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。根據(jù)我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)，無(wú)論是短期還是長(zhǎng)期氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，都會(huì)在"城市-保險(xiǎn)公司-年度"層面推高賠付率。然而，我們并未發(fā)現(xiàn)顯著證據(jù)表明氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)促使保險(xiǎn)公司改進(jìn)其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理實(shí)踐，例如提高再保險(xiǎn)比例或調(diào)整地域業(yè)務(wù)分布。這導(dǎo)致氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)保險(xiǎn)公司績(jī)效產(chǎn)生顯著負(fù)面影響，且這種影響主要源自賠付率而非運(yùn)營(yíng)費(fèi)用或投資收益。進(jìn)一步分析顯示，氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的不利影響在規(guī)模較小、再保險(xiǎn)覆蓋率較低或業(yè)務(wù)地域集中度較高的保險(xiǎn)公司中更為突出。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00364-1

Tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship and underwriting performance: evidence from the US property-casualty insurance industry

保險(xiǎn)公司與再保險(xiǎn)公司合作關(guān)系與承保績(jī)效：來(lái)自美國(guó)財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)業(yè)的證據(jù)

作者

Juei-Hsiang Chen（臺(tái)灣高雄大學(xué)），Yung-Ming Shiu（臺(tái)灣政治大學(xué)）

摘要：This study analyses National Association of Insurance Commissioners data on US property-casualty insurers from 2010 to 2020 using a one-step system generalised method of moments model. We examine the correlation between the duration of insurer–reinsurer relationships and underwriting performance, with relationship depth measured by historical reinsurance premiums. The findings are consistent with the asymmetric learning, real service, and monitoring hypotheses, suggesting that insurers begin to realise the benefits of reinsurance relationships only after approximately 3 years, particularly in the case of single unaffiliated insurers. This study underscores the significance of long-term reinsurance relationships for underwriting, proposes strategies for sustainable development, and offers practical insights for stakeholders.

本研究采用一步系統(tǒng)廣義矩估計(jì)模型，分析了美國(guó)保險(xiǎn)監(jiān)督官協(xié)會(huì)2010-2020年財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)公司的數(shù)據(jù)。我們考察了保險(xiǎn)公司與再保險(xiǎn)公司關(guān)系持續(xù)時(shí)間與承保績(jī)效之間的相關(guān)性，其中關(guān)系深度通過(guò)再保險(xiǎn)的歷史保費(fèi)衡量。研究結(jié)果支持不對(duì)稱(chēng)學(xué)習(xí)、實(shí)際服務(wù)和監(jiān)督假說(shuō)，表明保險(xiǎn)公司需經(jīng)過(guò)約3年時(shí)間才能開(kāi)始實(shí)現(xiàn)再保險(xiǎn)關(guān)系的收益，這一現(xiàn)象在獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的單一保險(xiǎn)公司中尤為明顯。本研究揭示了長(zhǎng)期再保險(xiǎn)關(guān)系對(duì)承保業(yè)務(wù)的重要意義，提出了可持續(xù)發(fā)展策略，并為相關(guān)利益方提供了實(shí)踐啟示。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00363-2

The impact of supplementary pension insurance programs on operational risk: insights from the perspective of employee retention

補(bǔ)充性養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響：基于員工留任視角的實(shí)證洞察

作者

Yalin Gong（西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)），Yangyang Liu（西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)），Li Lai（西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)）

摘要：This study investigates the impact of supplementary pension insurance programs (SPIPs) on the operational risk of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2019. Our findings reveal three key insights: (1) firms with SPIPs and higher investments in them exhibit lower operational risk than firms without SPIPs or with lower investments in them, (2) the risk-reducing effect of SPIPs is more pronounced in companies with more educated employees than in companies with less educated employees, and (3) SPIPs help lower operational risk by enhancing employee retention. We adopt China’s SPIP tax reform in 2008 as a natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model and a fixed effects model to address endogeneity concerns. Our study highlights the role of SPIPs not only as a form of endowment insurance but also as an important driver of the employee retention effect. These findings help stakeholders such as employees better understand SPIPs, and offer insights into the development of national strategies for addressing the challenges presented by the aging population.

本研究考察了2005至2019年間補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃對(duì)中國(guó)上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：（1）實(shí)施補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃且投入較高的企業(yè)，其經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著低于未實(shí)施或低投入企業(yè)；（2）該計(jì)劃的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)緩釋效應(yīng)在員工學(xué)歷較高的企業(yè)中更為顯著；（3）補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)主要通過(guò)提升員工留任率來(lái)降低經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我們以2008年我國(guó)補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)稅收改革作為自然實(shí)驗(yàn)，采用雙重差分模型與固定效應(yīng)模型處理內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題。研究表明，補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)不僅是養(yǎng)老保障體系的重要組成部分，更是通過(guò)員工留任效應(yīng)影響企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要機(jī)制。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)既幫助員工等利益相關(guān)方更深入理解補(bǔ)充養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)的價(jià)值，也為國(guó)家制定應(yīng)對(duì)人口老齡化挑戰(zhàn)的戰(zhàn)略提供了實(shí)證依據(jù)。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00349-0

Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and corporate R&D capitalisation: evidence from China

董事及高級(jí)職員責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)與企業(yè)研發(fā)資本化：來(lái)自中國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)

作者

Ting Gao（湖州師范學(xué)院），Xiaolong Ma（湖州師范學(xué)院）

摘要：Using a sample of Chinese A-listed companies from 2007 to 2023, we examine the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate accounting choices related to R&D expenditures. Our results indicate that firms with D&O insurance are more likely to capitalise R&D expenditures. Mechanism analysis suggests that managers’ risk appetite serves as a key channel through which D&O insurance promotes R&D capitalisation. Furthermore, the effect is stronger when firms face higher financing and performance pressures, but weaker when internal and external monitoring mechanisms are more effective. Finally, we find that increased R&D capitalisation due to D&O insurance is associated with lower patent outputs, but has no significant impact on non-patent outputs. These findings highlight the role of D&O insurance on R&D accounting choices and contribute to the empirical literature on its broader consequences.

本研究以2007-2023年中國(guó)A股上市公司為樣本，考察董事及高級(jí)職員責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)支出會(huì)計(jì)處理方式的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：購(gòu)買(mǎi)董責(zé)險(xiǎn)的企業(yè)更傾向于對(duì)研發(fā)支出進(jìn)行資本化處理。機(jī)制分析表明，管理層的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)意愿是董責(zé)險(xiǎn)推動(dòng)研發(fā)資本化的關(guān)鍵路徑。進(jìn)一步分析顯示，當(dāng)企業(yè)面臨較高融資壓力和業(yè)績(jī)壓力時(shí)，該效應(yīng)更為顯著；而當(dāng)內(nèi)外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制較為完善時(shí)，該效應(yīng)則有所減弱。最后研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，董責(zé)險(xiǎn)引致的研發(fā)資本化雖然會(huì)降低企業(yè)的專(zhuān)利產(chǎn)出，但對(duì)非專(zhuān)利創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出并無(wú)顯著影響。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)揭示了董責(zé)險(xiǎn)對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇的影響，為理解其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果提供了新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00353-4

How does directors’ and officers’ liability insurance affect the fulfilment of social responsibility by state-owned enterprises?

董事及高級(jí)職員責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任履行的影響機(jī)制

作者

Ruiyun Wanyan（西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)），Ying Sun（中國(guó)財(cái)產(chǎn)再保險(xiǎn)有限責(zé)任公司），Lingyan Suo（北京大學(xué)），Tongpu Zhao（北京大學(xué)）

摘要：This paper investigates how directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) functions as a policy-embedded accountability mechanism in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a balanced panel of A-share listed SOEs in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2021, and adopting the regulator-endorsed Hexun corporate social responsibility (CSR) index, we find that D&O insurance coverage significantly improves CSR performance, with an effect size roughly twice that documented for the broader ESG sample in prior studies. Going beyond traditional governance explanations, we identify and empirically validate three SOE-specific mechanisms: political-promotion incentives (driven by cadre evaluation), reputation-strategic pay-offs, and continuous insurer monitoring. These mechanisms clarify why D&O insurance operates not only as a market tool but also as a high-salience political compliance signal within China’s unique hybrid institutional environment. In contrast, D&O insurance has no significant effect among non-SOEs. Our findings reconceptualise D&O insurance as a strategic device for embedding state objectives into corporate behaviour, offering a theoretical and empirical benchmark for similar hybrid governance systems worldwide.

本研究探討董事及高級(jí)職員責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)如何作為政策嵌入的問(wèn)責(zé)機(jī)制在中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)中發(fā)揮作用。基于2010-2021年滬深A(yù)股國(guó)有上市企業(yè)的平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)，并采用監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)可的和訊社會(huì)責(zé)任評(píng)分體系，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)董責(zé)險(xiǎn)顯著提升企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任表現(xiàn)，其影響幅度約為現(xiàn)有ESG研究中普遍樣本的兩倍。突破傳統(tǒng)公司治理理論的解釋框架，我們識(shí)別并實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了三個(gè)國(guó)有企業(yè)特有機(jī)制：政治晉升激勵(lì)（源于干部考核體系）、聲譽(yù)戰(zhàn)略回報(bào)，以及保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)的持續(xù)監(jiān)督。這些機(jī)制揭示了在中國(guó)獨(dú)特的混合制度環(huán)境下，董責(zé)險(xiǎn)不僅作為市場(chǎng)工具，更成為高顯著度的政治合規(guī)信號(hào)。與之形成對(duì)比的是，董責(zé)險(xiǎn)在非國(guó)有企業(yè)中未產(chǎn)生顯著影響。本研究將董責(zé)險(xiǎn)重新概念化為國(guó)家目標(biāo)嵌入企業(yè)行為的戰(zhàn)略工具，為全球同類(lèi)混合治理體系提供了理論與實(shí)證參照基準(zhǔn)。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00362-3

Testing for moral hazard: a longitudinal examination of group life and health insurance in Taiwan

道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)檢驗(yàn)：基于臺(tái)灣地區(qū)團(tuán)體壽險(xiǎn)與健康險(xiǎn)的縱向研究

作者

Wen-Yen Hsu（臺(tái)灣逢甲大學(xué)），Carol Troy（臺(tái)灣東海大學(xué)國(guó)際學(xué)院）

摘要：Like auto insurance, employer-sponsored group health and life insurance (ESHI) uses experience rating, where current-year premium adjustments are positively correlated with the group’s claim history. In Taiwan, ESHI coexists with the national health insurance system, and previous findings based on western data may not hold. We test for moral hazard in ESHI plans offered by a Taiwanese life/health insurer, using a dynamic panel approach that distinguishes moral hazard from adverse selection. Experience rating should incentivise financially responsible employers to boost loss prevention/reduction efforts. Using Tobit models, we find that premium adjustments exert an asymmetric (consistently negative) impact on average claim volume (the loss ratio). However, moral hazard, indicated by negative state dependence (negative correlation between current and lagged values), is absent. The results suggest that experience rating alone cannot mitigate overconsumption of benefits. More varied and flexible approaches to cost control are needed.

與車(chē)險(xiǎn)類(lèi)似，雇主提供的團(tuán)體健康險(xiǎn)與壽險(xiǎn)采用經(jīng)驗(yàn)費(fèi)率定價(jià)法，即當(dāng)期保費(fèi)調(diào)整與團(tuán)體歷史賠付記錄呈正相關(guān)。在臺(tái)灣地區(qū)，該險(xiǎn)種與全民健康保險(xiǎn)體系并存，基于西方數(shù)據(jù)的既有結(jié)論可能不再適用。我們采用動(dòng)態(tài)面板數(shù)據(jù)，通過(guò)區(qū)分道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與逆向選擇，對(duì)臺(tái)灣某壽險(xiǎn)/健康險(xiǎn)公司提供的團(tuán)體險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。根據(jù)理論，經(jīng)驗(yàn)費(fèi)率機(jī)制應(yīng)激勵(lì)具有財(cái)務(wù)意識(shí)的雇主加強(qiáng)損失預(yù)防/控制措施。通過(guò)Tobit模型分析，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)保費(fèi)調(diào)整對(duì)平均索賠量（損失率）產(chǎn)生不對(duì)稱(chēng)（持續(xù)為負(fù)）的影響。然而，表征道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的負(fù)狀態(tài)依賴(lài)性（當(dāng)期與滯后值負(fù)相關(guān)）并未出現(xiàn)。結(jié)果表明，僅靠經(jīng)驗(yàn)費(fèi)率定價(jià)無(wú)法抑制福利過(guò)度消費(fèi)，需要采取更多樣化、更靈活的成本控制手段。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00354-3

Does reinsurance affect capital structure deviations? Evidence from US property–casualty insurers

再保險(xiǎn)是否影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)偏離？——來(lái)自美國(guó)財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)業(yè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)

作者

Xiaoyi Li（西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)），Yung-Ming Shiu（臺(tái)灣政治大學(xué)）

摘要：This study explores the effect of hedging on capital structure deviations by examining whether and how reinsurance affects the capital structure deviation of both underleveraged and overleveraged insurers. Although previous research findings indicated that risk management tools increase actual leverage, we discover that reinsurance, a commonly used risk management tool for property–casualty insurers, is associated with reduced absolute values of actual and target leverage deviations. Our findings suggest that reinsurance moves an insurer’s actual leverage towards its target leverage. Our difference-in-differences analysis using Hurricane Sandy, which devastated Atlantic regions in 2012, as an exogenous shock to reinsurance, is consistent with our main results. Additionally, we find that insurers with reinsurance exhibit a capital structure adjustment speed approximately 6.9% quicker than insurers without reinsurance.

本研究通過(guò)考察再保險(xiǎn)如何影響資本不足與資本過(guò)剩保險(xiǎn)公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)偏離，深入探究風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)沖對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)偏差的作用機(jī)制。盡管既有研究認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工具會(huì)提升實(shí)際杠桿率，但我們發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)產(chǎn)險(xiǎn)公司普遍使用的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工具——再保險(xiǎn)，能夠顯著降低實(shí)際與目標(biāo)杠桿偏離度的絕對(duì)值。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明，再保險(xiǎn)會(huì)推動(dòng)保險(xiǎn)公司的實(shí)際杠桿率向目標(biāo)水平收斂。我們以2012年重創(chuàng)大西洋沿岸的颶風(fēng)"桑迪"作為再保險(xiǎn)的外生沖擊進(jìn)行雙重差分檢驗(yàn)，結(jié)果與主結(jié)論一致。此外，投保再保險(xiǎn)的保險(xiǎn)公司其資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度較未投保者快約6.9%。

原文鏈接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-025-00356-1

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