梅里·馬達沙希｜北極作為戰略舞臺：美中競爭與權力地理的新格局

IPP評論是國家高端智庫華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺。

導語：最新研究顯示，北極冬季海冰面積連續第二年降至自1979年有衛星觀測記錄以來的最低水平。隨著冰蓋加速消融，北極的航道潛力和資源價值正不斷上升，并逐步轉化為新的地緣戰略籌碼。

IPP榮譽教授梅里·馬達沙希指出，冰層融化降低了進入北極的物理門檻，但并未讓該區域變得“輕易可達”。相反，有限而不均衡的開放，反而加劇了各方在準入、基建與規則影響力上的戰略博弈。因此，我們可以將北極視為觀察氣候變化如何重繪權力地理的一個窗口。

梅里·馬達沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

正文

The Arctic as Strategic Theatre:

U.S.–China Rivalry and the New Geography of Power

北極作為戰略舞臺：美中競爭與權力地理的新格局

北極已不再只是環保議題的焦點，它正日益成為一個戰略舞臺。在這里，氣候變化、基礎設施建設、治理博弈與大國競爭不斷交織。這片曾被視為遙遠而脆弱的氣候空間，如今正同時被環境力量和地緣政治所重塑。

The Arctic is no longer merely a zone of environmental concern. It is becoming a strategic theatre where climate change, infrastructure, governance, and great-power competition increasingly intersect. What was once treated largely as a remote and fragile climatic space is now being reshaped by forces that are environmental and geopolitical at the same time.

目前，北極變暖的速度仍快于全球平均水平。官方監測確認，北極海冰仍處于長期急劇萎縮之中。根據美國國家海洋和大氣管理局（NOAA）的數據，2025年3月記錄到的冬季海冰最大范圍為衛星觀測時代以來最低水平；此后的官方監測也進一步確認，北極海冰仍在持續大幅下降。

Arctic warming continues to outpace the global average. Official monitoring confirms that Arctic sea ice remains in sharp long-term decline. According to NOAA, in March 2025, the winter maximum recorded was the lowest in the satellite era,and official monitoring confirms that sea ice remains in steep long-term decline since then.

美國航空航天局26日發布公報稱，最新研究顯示，北極冬季海冰面積連續第二年降至自1979年有衛星觀測記錄以來的最低水平。圖源：美國國家海洋和大氣管理局（NOAA）

這種環境變化之所以重要，在于它正在改變進入北極的物質條件。一個更溫暖的北極，可能會延長季節性通航窗口，改變航運路線的地理格局，并使部分沿海及近海活動比以往更具可行性。近期經同行評審的研究表明，北極的通航能力在本世紀內可能還會繼續提升，尤其是在更強破冰能力船舶不斷發展的情況下更是如此。一些情景預測甚至認為，到本世紀后期，北方海航道的部分區段可能接近實現全年通航。

This environmental transformation matters because it is altering the material conditions of access. A warmer Arctic can lengthen seasonal navigation windows, affect the geography of shipping routes, and make some coastal and offshore activities more feasible than before. Recent peer-reviewed research suggests that Arctic navigability could continue to expand over the course of the century, especially with the development of more ice-capable vessels. Some scenarios projected near year-round use of parts of the Northern Sea Route later in the century.

但這并不意味著北極會變成一個沒有摩擦與沖突的空間。得出這樣的結論，不僅錯誤，而且危險。冰層融化，并不會自動帶來開發利用的便利。惡劣天氣、不斷變化的冰情、薄弱的港口和救援設施、高昂的保險與運營成本、環境脆弱性，以及尚未解決的監管問題——這些因素仍在嚴重制約著北極的進程。

But this does not mean that the Arctic is becoming frictionless. That would be the wrong conclusion, and a dangerous one. Melting ice does not automatically produce easy exploitation. Severe weather, shifting ice conditions, weak port and rescue infrastructure, high insurance and operating costs, environmental vulnerability, and unresolved regulatory questions continue to impose major constraints in this regard.

換言之，北極確實正變得更容易進入，但并非“輕易可達”。這一區分至關重要，因為恰恰是這種局部的、不均衡的開放，正在加劇戰略競爭。該地區并不是以一種平穩、穩定、線性的方式開放，而是在不確定條件下有選擇地開放，并由此帶來一系列戰略后果。

In other words, the Arctic is becoming more accessible, but not simply accessible. That distinction is essential, because it is precisely this partial and uneven opening that is intensifying strategic competition. The region is not opening in a smooth, stable, linear way; it is opening selectively, under uncertainty, and with strategic consequences.

正是在這一不斷變化的格局中，美國對中國的關切變得愈發強烈。中國并非北極國家，但多年來一直試圖通過科學研究、航運雄心、投資、對基礎設施的興趣以及外交布局，將自身塑造為一個具有正當性的“利益關聯方”。中國在2018年發布的《中國的北極政策白皮書》中明確將自己界定為“近北極國家”，并將北極參與同航運、資源利用、科學認知、治理參與以及更宏大的“冰上絲綢之路”構想聯系起來。

It is within that changing landscape that U.S. concern over China has grown sharper. China is not an Arctic state, yet it has spent years seeking to establish itself as a legitimate stakeholder through scientific research, shipping ambitions, investment, infrastructure interest, and diplomatic positioning. In its 2018 white paper, Beijing explicitly framed itself as a “near-Arctic state” and linked Arctic engagement to shipping, resource use, scientific knowledge, governance participation, and the broader idea of a Polar Silk Road.

目前，中國已經具備了在90%以上的南極冰蓋和全部北極冰蓋開展鉆探研究的能力。圖源：新華社

從華盛頓的視角看，這早已不僅是科學興趣或商業多元化的議題。美國越來越傾向于將其解讀為一種更廣泛的模式：經濟、技術和科研活動，同樣可能為更長期的地緣政治影響力奠定基礎。美國國防部發布的《2024年北極戰略》明確將北極置于戰略競爭的背景之下，指出俄羅斯的軍事態勢與中國日益增長的興趣，是這一演變態勢的核心特征。此后，美國國防高層的公開表態進一步強化了這樣一個判斷——中國在擴大與俄羅斯的北極合作的同時，也希望自身被承認為一個“北極力量”。

From Washington’s perspective, this is no longer viewed simply as a matter of scientific curiosity or commercial diversification. It is increasingly interpreted as part of a broader pattern in which economic, technological, and research activities may also create the foundations for longer-term geopolitical influence. The US Defense Department Arctic Strategy in 2024, explicitly places the region within the context of strategic competition, identifying both Russia’s military posture and China’s growing interest as central features of the evolving environment. Senior U.S. defense messaging since then has reinforced the point that China is trying to be recognized as an Arctic power while expanding cooperation with Russia in the region.

這也正是為何北極已被納入更廣泛的中美競爭邏輯之中。問題不僅在于中國是否可能直接獲得資源或航道準入，更在于中國能否逐步嵌入那些將長期塑造該地區的基礎設施、物流體系、科研網絡、通信體系、數據系統以及治理安排之中。

That is why the Arctic has entered the wider logic of U.S.–China rivalry. The question is not only whether China might gain direct access to resources or routes, but whether China can gradually embed itself in the infrastructure, logistics, scientific networks, communications, data systems, and governance arrangements that will help shape the region over time.

從這個意義上說，北極折射出美國一種更深層次的擔憂：在戰略敏感的空間里，影響力的形成往往不是通過劇烈、突出的方式，而是靠漸進累積。問題的關鍵在于持續性的布局。畢竟，北極之所以重要，不僅因為它今天的狀況，更因為氣候變化可能會進一步提升它的戰略價值。

In that sense, the Arctic reflects a broader American concern: that influence in strategically sensitive spaces may be built incrementally, not dramatically. The issue is less immediate domination than cumulative positioning. The Arctic matters not only because of what it is today, but because climate change may steadily increase its strategic relevance tomorrow.

然而，北極不能僅僅通過中美雙邊框架來理解。俄羅斯仍然是該地區居于核心地位的領土性和軍事性力量。它擁有最長的北極海岸線、廣泛的軍事基礎設施，以及沿北方海航道極具優勢的地理位置。即便在烏克蘭戰爭導致地區關系嚴重破裂之后，莫斯科也并未簡單地將北極拱手讓給北京。

Yet the Arctic cannot be understood through a purely bilateral U.S.-China frame. Russia remains the central territorial and military power in the region. It possesses the longest Arctic coastline, extensive military infrastructure, and a commanding geographical position along the Northern Sea Route. Even after the rupture produced by the war in Ukraine, Moscow has not simply yielded the Arctic to Beijing.

根據俄國家杜馬2024年通過的法案，俄全國有10個聯邦主體全部或部分領土被列入北極地區，占國土面積的22%。圖源：Getty Images

相反，俄羅斯與中國是在有選擇地走近，尤其在航運、能源和投資等領域。但與此同時，這一關系始終帶有明顯的不對稱性和謹慎色彩。一方面，制裁壓力、與西方的共同對立以及彼此需求的互補，使這一伙伴關系不斷得到強化；另一方面，其中也潛藏著內在的張力：中國傾向于尋求更廣泛的商業準入，而俄羅斯則決意維持對北方海航道及周邊北極空間的主權控制。隨著時間推移，這種不對稱性可能讓中國陷入一種微妙的境地——中國的重要性足以讓俄羅斯離不開，卻又不足以擁有塑造規則的影響力；中國在北極已經實際“入場”，但在制度層面仍被限制為觀察員身份。

Rather, Russia and China have moved closer selectively, especially in shipping, energy, and investment, while maintaining a relationship marked by asymmetry and caution. The partnership is partly strengthened by sanctions, shared rivalry with the West, and complementary needs, but it also contains an underlying tension between China’s preference for broader commercial access and Russia’s determination to preserve sovereign control over the Northern Sea Route and the surrounding Arctic space. Over time, this asymmetry could place China in a delicate position: important enough to be needed, but not influential enough to shape the rules; present in the region, but still confined institutionally to observer status within Arctic governance.

就目前而言，俄羅斯向中國提供的是地理條件、進入通道以及軍事上的“分量”；作為交換，中國帶來的是資本、技術和商業輻射能力。在華盛頓看來，這種不斷演進的趨近之所以令人擔憂，是因為它可能在這一戰略重要性日益上升的地區，逐步凝聚成一股對沖西方影響力的力量。

Through Russia, for now, China is being provided with geography, access, and military weight and in return China brings capital, technology, and commercial reach. For Washington, this evolving convergence is worrying not because it amounts to a formal alliance, but because it can gradually consolidate a counterweight to Western influence in a region of rising strategic importance.

這些焦慮又因更廣泛的地緣政治背景而進一步加深。烏克蘭戰爭嚴重改變了北極的政治環境，因為它動搖了北極理事會賴以運作的合作基礎。自2022年俄烏沖突爆發以來，這一制度框架已遭到嚴重削弱。人們開始質疑：它是否還能以任何有意義的方式恢復？

These anxieties are reinforced by the wider geopolitical context. The war in Ukraine has profoundly altered the Arctic political environment by undermining the cooperative foundations on which the Arctic Council once depended. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, that institutional framework has been severely weakened, raising persistent questions about whether it can be revived in any meaningful form.

與此同時，這場沖突也使北約的注意力重新轉向領土防御、北方威懾、后勤保障以及關鍵基礎設施保護。芬蘭和瑞典加入北約，進一步重塑了北方高緯地區的戰略版圖，使得北極與次北極地區在聯盟規劃中的地位比以往更加突出。

At the same time, the conflict has redirected NATO’s attention toward territorial defense, northern deterrence, logistics, and the protection of critical infrastructure. It has also reshaped the strategic map of the High North by bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO, thereby making the Arctic and sub-Arctic more central to alliance planning than before.

這種轉變也體現在美國國防部《2024年北極戰略》中。該戰略將俄烏沖突、芬蘭和瑞典加入北約，以及中俄合作不斷加深，列為推動該地區地緣政治變化的幾大主要因素。北約自身的公開表述如今已將聯盟所處的安全環境描述為冷戰結束以來最危險的時期。與此同時，美國高級軍事指揮官也指出，俄羅斯在北極不斷擴張的軍事態勢——包括機場設施和北方艦隊活動——正日益對大西洋地區以及通往北美的極地通道構成挑戰。

This shift is reflected in the 2024 U.S. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, which identifies Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, and growing China–Russia collaboration as major drivers of geopolitical change in the region. NATO’s own public language now describes the alliance as operating in its most dangerous security environment since the Cold War, while senior U.S. commanders have pointed to Russia’s expanding Arctic posture — including airfields and Northern Fleet activity — as a growing challenge to the Atlantic and the polar approaches to North America.

在大國競爭再度升溫、聯盟加快調整、高北地區戰略重心發生轉移的背景下，加拿大在北極的作用遠比公共討論通常所承認的更為重要。長期以來，加拿大在輿論中往往被視為次要角色，但近年來，它已更加明顯地鞏固自身在北極的姿態——包括強化監視能力、推進國防現代化、開展基礎設施規劃以及加強主權論述。渥太華正在推進的“北極超視距雷達”項目，是其更廣泛的北美防空司令部（NORAD）現代化的一部分，旨在擴大對北方方向的預警與威脅追蹤能力。加拿大官方也明確將該項目界定為對北極安全與主權的貢獻。

Against this backdrop of renewed great power rivalary, alliance adaptation, and strategic reorientation in the High North, Canada’s role in the Arctic becomes far more signifcant than public debate often acknowledges. Too often treated as a secondary actor in public debate, Canada has in recent years moved more visibly to reinforce its Arctic posture through surveillance, defense modernization, infrastructure planning, and a stronger sovereignty discourse. Ottawa’s Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar project, part of its broader NORAD modernization effort, is intended to expand early warning and threat tracking across the northern approaches. The project is explicitly framed by Canadian authorities as a contribution to Arctic security and sovereignty.

這絕非一次細微調整。它反映出加拿大更深層次的認識：北極不僅是一條商業通道，更是一個關乎領土控制、大陸防御、原住民伙伴關系以及治理能力的現實問題。隨著北極準入在不均衡狀態下持續擴大，渥太華越來越擔心，包括中國在內的外部力量可能通過科學研究、投資、基礎設施或戰略伙伴關系，進一步加深在該地區的立足點。因此，加拿大不想只做旁觀者，而是正試圖成為規則塑造者。

This is not a minor adjustment. It reflects a deeper recognition in Canada that an opening Arctic is not simply a future commercial corridor, but an immediate question of territorial control, continental defense, indigenous partnership, and governance capacity. As Arctic access expands unevenly, Ottawa is increasingly concerned that outside powers, including China, may seek to deepen their regional foothold through science, investment, infrastructure, or strategic partnerships. Canada is therefore, not merely watching the region change. It is trying to shape the terms under which that change occurs.

一家由因紐特人擁有的新型國防公司計劃將其北極專業知識與先進的軍事技術相結合，以支持加拿大的北部安全行動。Source：Canadian Armed Forces

因此，核心悖論正在于此：氣候變化讓北極變得更易進入，卻并未讓它完全可進入。也正是這種不完全的可進入性，使北極變得更具爭奪性。一個部分開放的地區，會在規則、基礎設施和力量平衡尚未定型之前，激勵各方提前展開戰略布局。完全封閉的空間會抑制競爭；完全開放且治理完善的空間則可能使局勢趨于穩定。然而，一個僅部分可及、治理薄弱且環境脆弱的地區，反而更容易引發競爭。

The central paradox, then, is this: climate change is making the Arctic more accessible without making it fully accessible. That is precisely why it is becoming more contested. A region that is partially opening creates incentives for early strategic positioning before rules, infrastructure, and balances of power fully settle. A fully closed space deters competition; a fully open and well-regulated one may stabilize it. But a partially accessible, weakly governed, environmentally fragile region invites rivalry.

在美國的防務思維中，北極與本土安全、預警、導彈防御、聯盟信譽以及海上通道準入直接相關。在這一背景下，格陵蘭重新獲得了突出的戰略地位，因為皮圖菲克太空基地（Pituffik Space Base）等基礎設施，構成了美國監視北方與維持威懾體系的重要支點。隨著北極變得更加可通航、也更具爭奪性，美國的關切正從傳統軍事威脅，擴展到那些更為隱性的影響力工具：港口、物流、科研、衛星系統、海底測繪、數字連通性，以及與俄羅斯的長期伙伴關系。因而，在北京看來可能只是商業或科研相關性的事務，在華盛頓眼中卻可能被視為一種戰略杠桿的構建。

In U.S. defence thinking, the Arctic is tied directly to homeland security, early warning, missile defence, alliance credibility, and maritime access. Greenland has acquired renewed prominence in this context not only because of its location, but because infrastructure such as Pituffik Space Base anchors the northern architecture of surveillance and deterrence. As the Arctic becomes more navigable and more contested, U.S. concern is expanding from classic military threats to the quieter instruments of influence: ports, logistics, research, satellite systems, undersea mapping, digital connectivity, and long-term partnership with Russia. What appears from Beijing as commercial or scientific relevance can therefore appear from Washington as the slow construction of strategic leverage.

在這一背景下，頭號危險因素或許不是軍事對抗，而有可能是戰略互疑——而該地區的環境脆弱性，已經超過了現有治理能力所能應對的范圍。北極已不再只是全球性失序的一種警示信號。它正成為一個試驗場，用以檢驗氣候轉型究竟能否通過克制、制度與合作加以管理，抑或會進一步加深如今已深刻塑造國際體系的那種競爭性秩序建構。

In this context, the danger lies less in an imminent military confrontation than in the steady accumulation of strategic mistrust across a region whose environmental vulnerability is already outpacing governance capacity. The Arctic is no longer only a warning sign of planetary disruption. It is becoming a test case of whether climate transformation will be managed through restraint, institutions, and cooperation - or whether it will deepen the competitive order-building that now marks so much of the international system.

因此，北極正在形成的“新地理”并不只是物理意義上的，也是政治意義上的。隨著冰層退卻，距離正在被重新定義，準入條件正在被重新計算，戰略想象也在被重新繪制。北極已不再處于世界政治的邊緣。它正越來越靠近其中心——并不是因為北極不再脆弱，而是因為這種脆弱性如今已與權力問題密不可分。

Accordingly, the Arctic’s new geography is not only physical. It is political. As ice retreats, distance is being redefined, access recalculated, and strategic imagination redrawn. The region is no longer at the margins of world politics. It is moving closer to the center, not because the Arctic has ceased to be fragile, but because its fragility is now inseparable from power.

歸根結底，這正是北極之所以如此重要的原因。它不僅是氣候變化的晴雨表，也是世界秩序的一面鏡子。而它如今越來越清晰映照出的，是這樣一種體系：環境變化與地緣政治競爭已不再是兩條彼此平行的發展線索，而正在成為同一個故事的組成部分。

This, ultimately, is why the Arctic matters so much. It is not only a barometer of climate change. It is also a mirror of world order. And what it increasingly reflects is a system in which environmental transformation and geopolitical rivalry are no longer parallel developments. They are becoming part of the same story.

北極不應再僅僅被視為遙遠的北方邊疆，也不應只被看作中美競爭的一個地區性舞臺。它正成為氣候變化如何重繪權力地理的一種早期例證。隨著冰層退卻，問題已不再只是環境損失本身，而是一個新的戰略空間正在浮現；在這一空間中，準入、存在、基礎設施與影響力，都在脆弱性與不確定性的條件下被重新計算。

The Arctic should no longer be viewed simply as a remote northern frontier, nor only as a regional theatre of U.S.–China rivalry. It is becoming something more consequential: an early example of how climate change can redraw the geography of power. As ice retreats, the issue is no longer merely environmental loss. It is the emergence of a new strategic space in which access, presence, infrastructure, and influence are being recalculated under conditions of fragility and uncertainty.

這正是為什么北極的重要性超出了北極本身。它預示著一種更廣泛的地緣政治未來：環境擾動將日益重塑權力投射與競爭所依托的空間。從這個意義上說，北極所面臨的風險，不僅在于它自身會受到競爭的影響，更在于它可能成為一種范本，預示競爭將如何在一個被氣候變化重塑的世界中演變。

That is why the Arctic matters beyond the Arctic itself. It offers a preview of a wider geopolitical future in which environmental disruption will increasingly reshape the spaces through which power is projected and contested. In that sense, the region is not simply at risk from rivalry; it is at risk of becoming a model for how rivalry evolves in a climate-altered world.

所以，我們真正的挑戰在于，防止競爭成為北極治理的唯一邏輯。如果缺少有效的規則、有韌性的制度，以及各方對克制的承諾，那北極最終只會證明一件事：我們連自己所在的這個星球都治理不好。

The challenge, therefore, is not to imagine that competition can be removed from the Arctic. It is to prevent competition from becoming the only logic through which the region is governed. Without stronger rules, greater institutional resilience, and a renewed commitment to restraint, the Arctic may come to symbolize not only the failure to protect a fragile environment, but the failure to govern a changing planet.

最后，我們不應再將北極視為一片凍結的邊緣地帶，而應把它看作新興地緣政治的實驗室。它正逐漸成為一個“門檻地帶”——舊有的全球格局在這里讓位于新的秩序。北極依然高度脆弱，但戰略地位正在上升。冰層融化不僅露出了更多土地，更改變了這些土地的戰略意義。其結果是，北極正成為一個環境不穩定性與地緣政治雄心同時增強的地區。

The Arctic should be seen less as a frozen margin and more as a laboratory of emerging geopolitics. It is increasingly a threshold region: a space where one global era is giving way to another. It remains environmentally fragile, yet it is also acquiring new strategic weight. What makes the region significant is not only the presence of U.S.–China rivalry, but the fact that climate change is reshaping the material conditions under which rivalry unfolds. Melting ice is not just exposing territory; it is altering the strategic meaning of territory itself. The result is a region where environmental instability and geopolitical ambition now evolve together.

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華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）是一個獨立、非營利性的知識創新與公共政策研究平臺。IPP圍繞中國的體制改革、社會政策、中國話語權與國際關系等開展一系列的研究工作，并在此基礎上形成知識創新和政策咨詢協調發展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造開放式的知識創新和政策研究平臺，成為領先世界的中國智庫。