Takaichi's win ushers in unchecked conservative rule in Japan

ByLu Hao

On February 18, Sanae Takaichi, president of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was elected as Japan's 105th Prime Minister by lawmakers in parliament.

With the LDP in sole control of the House of Representatives and the Takaichi administration's approval rating exceeding 60 percent, conservative forces have fully consolidated their grip on Japan's political landscape, further intensifying the rightward shift in Japanese politics. The "strong reforms" championed by Takaichi in the economic and security fields will face far fewer obstacles and are certain to advance rapidly. Japan will also press further toward its "great power ambitions," accelerating its drive to break away from the post?World War II political power and push for re?militarization.

The LDP's landslide victory in the House of Representatives election on February 8 highlights marked changes in Japan's domestic political and social ecology. On the one hand, mobilized vigorously by Takaichi, right-wing forces in Japan's political and social spheres have rallied together with growing momentum, taking a more proactive stance in shaping the national political agenda. On the other hand, the populist-tinged economic and security policies advocated by Takaichi have fully aligned with voters' psychological demands, providing them with "emotional value" and "expectations for the future."

After the election, Japanese media noted that the election results reflected not only voters' dissatisfaction with current economic and social conditions but also their desire for a "strong leader" to change the status quo. Some media commented that "amid a lack of substantive policy debates, a massive wave of support emerged for Takaichi, driven by voters eager to break the 'glass ceiling' for women in politics." Against this backdrop, Takaichi's crafted public image and policy promises precisely catered to the demands of a large number of centrist voters.

During the election campaign, the LDP made extensive use of social platforms; videos related to Takaichi posted on the party's official YouTube channel garnered over 100 million views within two weeks, sparking speculation on social media about whether the LDP had invested huge advertising fees.

Meanwhile, Japan's traditional center-left political forces have further declined. In this election, opposition parties hastily formed the "Centrist Reform Alliance," a coalition based on expediency that failed to fully promote its policy platforms and secure broad public support, and was widely regarded as a failed strategy.

In the eyes of the Japanese public, the current opposition lacks the credibility and executive capacity of a ruling party, leading many voters to prioritize "maintaining the status quo" at the polls. In this regard, many voices in Japanese society argue that the LDP's "overwhelming victory" did not entirely stem from active public endorsement, but rather was a passive choice by voters who could not trust the opposition. Public support for Takaichi represents a conditional mandate for her "tough stance and governance capabilities," not unconditional allegiance.

Takaichi re-elected as Japan's Prime Minister has ushered in an unprecedentedly optimistic governing situation for her administration. At a press conference, Takaichi reaffirmed her plan to accelerate revisions to the "Three Security Documents," expand the export of lethal weapons and establish a national intelligence agency. She also expressed a positive stance on amending the "Peace Constitution," stating her intent to "create an environment for a national referendum at an early date." Currently, the LDP and its ruling ally, the Japan Innovation Party, are pushing for the establishment of a "drafting committee" for constitutional amendment to speed up the process.

In addition, Takaichi commented on visits to Yasukuni Shrine, saying she is "working to create an appropriate environment for worship." In response, voices of concern have emerged in Japanese society: Japan's political balance has been upended, and checks on extremism and hawkish positions are further weakening. Amid an atmosphere of "populist revelry," the Takaichi administration may act with greater impunity, leaning further toward right-wing extremism and authoritarianism.

For Japan's right-wing forces, challenging the "post-war order," breaking away from the "post-war regime" and achieving the "major power goal" represent a historic and long-term vision and endeavor. This pursuit is rooted in their own political ideology and also serves the private interests of certain factions.

Following the election, Takaichi, who claims to inherit the "Abe Doctrine" – the foreign and security policy framework developed under former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, will lean more toward implementing policies with a strong personal imprint, aiming to leave a so-called political legacy. This includes accelerating constitutional revision and systematic military buildup, actively promoting historical revisionism as the guiding national ideology and continuing to hype "peripheral security threats" to justify military expansion. She will seek so-called legitimacy for fully breaking the constraints of the Peace Constitution and the "exclusive defense" principle, as well as for strengthening the Japan-U.S. military alliance.

It can be foreseen that Japan's "re-militarization" will take more tangible shape in strategic planning, defense policy, military-industrial infrastructure and mobilization mechanisms, with an increasingly outward-looking and offensive posture.

A Japan that clings to cold-war confrontation mentality, advocates power politics and tough measures, actively seeks to lift restrictions on its military capabilities and regards neighboring countries as threats, can hardly be expected to play a stabilizing or constructive role in regional peace in the future. On the contrary, it is likely to act as a destabilizing force fueling regional security tensions, bloc confrontation, arms races and even the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The author isdean of the Strategic Studies Department of the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.