“臺(tái)灣有事就是日本有事”的正確解讀為-解放臺(tái)灣也得解放日本

日本方面口口聲聲“臺(tái)灣有事就是日本有事”，這可是來(lái)自那個(gè)被弄死的日本前首相級(jí)別人物之口，日本現(xiàn)任首相高市早苗更是“跳腳”，進(jìn)一步“加碼”表明態(tài)度要武力介入臺(tái)海。那我們就得要明確自己的態(tài)度了，臺(tái)獨(dú)肯定要“出事兒”，臺(tái)獨(dú)分子搞事就會(huì)“有事兒”，這是毋庸置疑的。既然日本希望自己“有事兒”，不想好過(guò)，那我們就要“成全”他們了，不讓他（她）們出點(diǎn)兒事兒，實(shí)在是對(duì)不起他（她）們了。我們對(duì)日本人口中的“臺(tái)灣有事就是日本有事”的正確解讀應(yīng)該就是：解放臺(tái)灣也得要解放日本。因?yàn)槿毡救说摹耙馑肌狈浅Ｃ黠@，即如果臺(tái)灣解放了、回家了，那他（她）們就沒(méi)得玩兒了，日本也得要跟著“回家”啊！

那我們?cè)撛趺崔k呢？就得要多手準(zhǔn)備了（當(dāng)然將日本列島“分而治之”、各自獨(dú)立管理是必要的做法，這個(gè)議題不是本篇的內(nèi)容，不作贅述），從法律、現(xiàn)實(shí)、歷史的局面進(jìn)行三重考量：

一方面，根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國(guó)憲章》等國(guó)際法的“敵國(guó)條款”規(guī)定，必要的時(shí)候（日本膽敢再次有侵略行為），我們可以直接出手滅掉那個(gè)侵略成性的小日本的，這就是法理基礎(chǔ)，且無(wú)需聯(lián)合國(guó)授權(quán)。

另一方面，打日本比打臺(tái)灣更有價(jià)值成就感，更有法理依據(jù)和民族的心理認(rèn)同感和精神歸屬感，打起來(lái)更是毫無(wú)顧忌、不留余地；也更能解決我們的海洋屏藩問(wèn)題（讓太平洋真正的“太平”起來(lái)），更是一吐我們胸中的那口國(guó)仇家恨的惡氣。

第三方面，從本質(zhì)來(lái)說(shuō)，日本列島才是我國(guó)的“外東北地區(qū)”，解放日本能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)解決我們的近海海洋屏藩和深海遠(yuǎn)洋的安全問(wèn)題（當(dāng)然，這也能升級(jí)我們走向“深藍(lán)”的一個(gè)安全系數(shù)）。同時(shí)，解放日本也能夠?yàn)槌r半島報(bào)仇雪恨，要知道日本是朝鮮（包括南朝鮮：韓國(guó)）的“千年宿敵”。

一言以蔽之，臺(tái)獨(dú)和倭奴本質(zhì)上是一丘之貉，我們古代歷史上對(duì)海洋的重視程度并不太高，這也是為什么我們東部沿海地帶經(jīng)常受到倭奴的騷擾的一個(gè)重要原因，臺(tái)灣處于東海的一個(gè)重要的基點(diǎn)之處，而日本是處于我們北海的一個(gè)重要基礎(chǔ)。所以，要解放日本和解放臺(tái)灣其實(shí)同等重要。

既然“臺(tái)灣有事就是日本有事”是倭奴的所追求的結(jié)局，這是倭奴強(qiáng)烈要求的，既然日本希望自己“有事兒”，如果我們太保守了，不讓他們出點(diǎn)事兒，那就對(duì)不起倭奴的“請(qǐng)求”了。因此、我們就不要客氣了！明確將“臺(tái)灣有事就是日本有事”解讀為“解放臺(tái)灣也得解放日本”?。〖热毁僚搿扒箦N得錘”，我們干脆就把“錘”給砸下來(lái)吧。

（以下是英文版 English edtion）

Global Refuel Episode 2: TheCorrect Interpretation of "A Taiwan Emergency is a JapaneseEmergency" is – Liberating Taiwan Necessitates Liberating Japan

The Japanese siderepeatedly claims that "a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency."These words came from the mouth of a former Japanese Prime Minister-levelfigure who was assassinated. Japan's current Prime Minister, Takaichi Sanae, iseven more "frenetic," further "upping the ante" by statingtheir stance to militarily intervene in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, we mustclearly define our own position. Taiwanese independence is definitely going to"cause trouble"; if the Taiwanese separatists stir things up, therewill be "an emergency" – this is beyond doubt. Since Japan wishes foritself to have "an emergency" and doesn't want things to go well,then we should "oblige" them. It would truly be a disservice to themif we didn't let them have their "emergency." Our correctinterpretation of the Japanese statement "a Taiwan emergency is a Japaneseemergency" should be this: liberating Taiwan also necessitates liberatingJapan. Because the Japanese "meaning" is very clear: if Taiwan isliberated and returns home, then they will have nothing left to play with;Japan must also "return home" accordingly!

So, what should we do?We must prepare on multiple fronts (Of course, the "divide and rule"of the Japanese archipelago and managing its parts independently is a necessarymeasure, but this topic is not the content of this article and won't be elaboratedupon here). We need to consider the situation from legal, practical, andhistorical perspectives:

On one hand, accordingto the "enemy state clauses" stipulated in international law such asthe United Nations Charter, when necessary (if Japan dares to engage inaggression again), we can directly step in and eliminate that inherentlyaggressive little Japan. This is the legal basis, and it does not require UNauthorization.

On the other hand,striking Japan holds more value and sense of accomplishment than strikingTaiwan; it has a stronger legal basis and resonates more with nationalpsychological identity and spiritual belonging. Furthermore, engaging Japanwould be done without any scruples or reservations. It would also moreeffectively solve the issue of our maritime defensive screen (making thePacific Ocean truly "pacific") and, moreover, allow us to vent thepent-up fury stemming from our national hatred and historical grievances.

On the third hand, inessence, the Japanese archipelago is actually our country's "OuterNortheast Region." Liberating Japan could achieve the resolution of ournear-sea defensive screen and ensure the security of our deep-water, far-oceanareas (Naturally, this would also upgrade our security coefficient as we movetowards the "deep blue"). Simultaneously, liberating Japan could alsoavenge the Korean Peninsula – it must be remembered that Japan is the"millennial arch-enemy" of Korea (including South Korea: the ROK).

In a nutshell, Taiwaneseseparatists and the Japanese dwarfs are essentially birds of a feather. In ourancient history, we did not place particularly high importance on the oceans,which is an important reason why our eastern coastal areas were frequentlyharassed by the Japanese dwarfs. Taiwan is located at a crucial focal point inthe East China Sea, while Japan sits at a fundamental position in our"North Sea" region. Therefore, liberating Japan is equally asimportant as liberating Taiwan.

Since "a Taiwanemergency is a Japanese emergency" is the outcome pursued by the Japanesedwarfs, and it is something they strongly demand; since Japan wishes for itselfto have "an emergency," if we are too conservative and don't let themhave their "trouble," it would be a disservice to the Japanesedwarfs' "request." Therefore, let's not be polite! We should clearlyinterpret "a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency" as"liberating Taiwan also necessitates liberating Japan"! Since theJapanese dwarfs seek a beating, let's just give them the "hammer"they're asking for.